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Abstract
This article is an attempt to a thorough chronological analysis of the European Community’s
(EC) existing law and policy in the field of international trade law since the beginning of the
European Economic Community. It deals with the evolution of the EC’s common
commercial policy competence through the years, starting with the European Coal and Steel
Community (ECSC), moving on to the necessary changes brought by the World Trade
Organization (WTO) Agreement, signed in Marrakesh in 1994, until the days of the
European Union (EU) Constitutional Treaty, with a view to enabling the EC with a coherent
trade policy in the WTO framework. Thus, a legal analysis of EC trade policy in the pre-
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Amsterdam Treaty period, at the Treaty of Amsterdam, at the Treaty of Nice, and during the
European Convention period, is provided, taking into account the most recent constitutional
developments of division of competences between the EC and its Member States.
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I. Introduction

The EC has become an important actor on the international scene, and since the 1970s, its
external relations have been growing both in number of agreements signed and in domains of
participation.1 The European Communities have participated in an important number of
multilateral conventions within the framework of the international or regional organizations,
and are increasingly present in world affairs. In the context of multilateral relations, they
have a growing role.2 The EC’s progression was not steady but was achieved in small steps,
as we will see in the analysis of this article.
This article begins with a legal clarification of Article 133 EC. Then, it continues with
an analysis of the emergence of the European Economic Community (EEC) (1958-1967).
Next is a discussion of the transfer of competence during the period of the merger of the
three European Communities and the end of the transitional period after the formation of the

1

For a policy analysis of the EC’s foreign economic policy, see Young, A.R. “The Adaptation of European
Foreign Economic Policy: From Rome to Seattle,” Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 38, No. 1, March
2000, pp. 93-116; see also, Young, A.R., Holmes, P. & Rollo, J. “The European Trade Agenda After Seattle,”
Sussex European Institute Working Paper No. 37, November 2000.
2
EUROPEAN COMMISSION, PARTICIPATION DES COMMUNAUTES EUROPEENNES AUX
ACCORDS MULTILATERAUX, Direction General I A, Introduction (1997).
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EEC (1967-1977), as well as other legal bases used by the EC for international trade
agreements. Opinion 1/94 of the European Court of Justice and its consequences for EC trade
policy is explored. An analysis of the Amsterdam and Nice negotiations, the changes made to
Article 133 EC by the Nice Treaty,3 and the confusion brought by those changes follows.
Finally, I will conclude with an analysis of the EU Constitutional Treaty’s work on EU trade
policy to see whether it could partly be the optimal solution to the trade-off of efficiency
versus accountability in trade policy decision-making.4

II. What Is Article 133 EC?

Article 133 EC (formerly Article 113 of the Treaty of Rome) is the legal basis for the
common commercial policy.5 It allows the EC “to negotiate, conclude and implement trade

3

The Treaty of Nice entered into force on February 1, 2003. It was accepted and ratified by all the Member
States between June 7, 2001 and July 2, 2002, most of the time through Parliament. Only Ireland ratified it by
referendum: after rejection of the Treaty by 53.87% of the voters in a first referendum on June 7, 2001, it finally
passed on the following October 19, with 62.89% of the votes.
4
At present, the EU is founded on four basic treaties that lay down the rules by which it has to operate. These
treaties are big and complex, and EU leaders intend to replace them with a single, shorter, simpler document
spelling out the EU's purposes and aims and stating clearly who does what. This new document (technically
known as the Constitutional Treaty) will be rather similar to the constitution of a country - even though the EU
is not, and does not aim to be, a single country. The text of this new EU Constitution was agreed in June 2004
and signed by all the Member State governments in October 2004 in Rome. It was due to come into force in
2006, but first it must be ratified by all the national parliaments and, in some countries, be approved by
referendum.
5
Article 133 EC reads:
1. The common commercial policy shall be based on uniform principles, particularly in regard to changes in
tariff rates, the conclusion of tariff and trade agreements, the achievement of uniformity in measures of
liberalisation, export policy and measures to protect trade such as those to be taken in the event of dumping or
subsidies.
2. The Commission shall submit proposals to the Council for implementing the common commercial policy.
3. Where agreements with one or more States or international organisations need to be negotiated, the
Commission shall make recommendations to the Council, which shall authorise the Commission to open the
necessary negotiations. The Council and the Commission shall be responsible for ensuring that the agreements
negotiated are compatible with internal Community policies and rules.
The Commission shall conduct these negotiations in consultation with a special committee appointed by the
Council to assist the Commission in this task and within the framework of such directives as the Council may
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agreements with other countries of the world.”6 EC trade activity includes trade in goods, but
only parts of trade in services, trade in the commercial aspects of intellectual property and
investment, which are shared with the Member States. Since the Treaty of Amsterdam, the
EC is competent to negotiate and conclude international agreements on services and
intellectual property rights but only if the EU Council so decides by unanimity, as we see in
Article 133(5) of the Amsterdam Treaty (now Article 133 (7) of the Nice Treaty).7
As defined by Article 133 EC, “the scope of the common commercial policy […] has
been interpreted very broadly by the Court of Justice. However, it does not cover
international negotiations and agreements relating to services and intellectual property, two
issue to it. The Commission shall report regularly to the special committee on the progress of negotiations.
The relevant provisions of Article 300 shall apply.
4. In exercising the powers conferred upon it by this Article, the Council shall act by a qualified majority.
5. Paragraphs 1 to 4 shall also apply to the negotiation and conclusion of agreements in the fields of trade in
services and the commercial aspects of intellectual property, in so far as those agreements are not covered by
the said paragraphs and without prejudice to paragraph 6.
By way of derogation from paragraph 4, the Council shall act unanimously when negotiating and concluding an
agreement in one of the fields referred to in the first subparagraph, where that agreement includes provisions for
which unanimity is required for the adoption of internal rules or where it relates to a field in which the
Community has not yet exercised the powers conferred upon it by this Treaty by adopting internal rules.
The Council shall act unanimously with respect to the negotiation and conclusion of a horizontal agreement
insofar as it also concerns the preceding subparagraph or the second subparagraph of paragraph 6.
This paragraph shall not affect the right of the Member States to maintain and conclude agreements with third
countries or international organisations in so far as such agreements comply with Community law and other
relevant international agreements.
6. An agreement may not be concluded by the Council if it includes provisions which would go beyond the
Community's internal powers, in particular by leading to harmonisation of the laws or regulations of the
Member States in an area for which this Treaty rules out such harmonisation.
In this regard, by way of derogation from the first subparagraph of paragraph 5, agreements relating to trade in
cultural and audiovisual services, educational services, and social and human health services, shall fall within
the shared competence of the Community and its Member States. Consequently, in addition to a Community
decision taken in accordance with the relevant provisions of Article 300, the negotiation of such agreements
shall require the common accord of the Member States. Agreements thus negotiated shall be concluded jointly
by the Community and the Member States.
The negotiation and conclusion of international agreements in the field of transport shall continue to be
governed by the provisions of Title V and Article 300.
7. Without prejudice to the first subparagraph of paragraph 6, the Council, acting unanimously on a proposal
from the Commission and after consulting the European Parliament, may extend the application of paragraphs 1
to 4 to international negotiations and agreements on intellectual property in so far as they are not covered by
paragraph 5.
6
http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/faqs/133.htm
7
Cremona, M. “EC External Commercial Policy after Amsterdam: Authority and Interpretation within
Interconnected Legal Orders,” in Weiler, J. (ed.) The EU, the WTO, and the NAFTA. Towards a Common Law
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areas being discussed within the WTO.”8 In relation to the scope of Article 113 (1-4) of the
Treaty of Rome on the common commercial policy, it was a non-exhaustive enumeration of
subjects covered.9 Paragraph 3 gives explicit and exclusive competence to the EC to
negotiate and enter international trade agreements with States or international organizations.
Years later, the Amsterdam Treaty inserted Article 133 (5) EC, which does not change the
scope of Article 133. It nevertheless authorizes the Council, acting unanimously, to extend
application of paragraphs 1-4 to international negotiations on services and commercial
aspects of intellectual property. All these issues will be analyzed later in this article.

III. Pre-WTO Period
A. 1952-1958: The ECSC As A Pioneer

The powers attributed to the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), specifically to its
High Authority in the field of external relations, were limited to the economic areas covered
by the Treaty of Paris, as well as being limited in nature. Articles 71-75 of the ECSC Treaty10
merely grant the institutions recourse to specific interventions to avoid undesirable situations.
Still, the founders of the ECSC paid close attention to its relations with the rest of the world,
the Western world in particular. Jean Monnet, the first president of the ECSC High
Authority, never considered the refusal of the UK to join the ECSC as a final “no” to the

of International Trade?, Oxford University Press, 2000.
8
See European Commission "Activities of the European Union. Summaries of Legislation. External Trade:
Introduction" available at http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/r11000.htm (last visited January 18, 2004).
9
For a legal analysis of the scope of the common commercial policy, see Koutrakos, P. EU International
Relations Law, Hart Publishing, 2006, pp. 33-75.
10
The ECSC was created by the Treaty of Paris, 1952.
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concept of European integration. On the contrary, he set out to establish a close working
relationship with the UK Government and rejected any kind of distinction between members
and non-members, who were called “third countries.”11
During this period, there were difficult questions as to the right of the High Authority to
receive foreign envoys.12 Days after the High Authority started its work, UK and U.S.
diplomatic missions were accredited to the ECSC, and these were later followed by Austrian,
Swiss, Swedish and Danish missions, among others. However, by the autumn of 1952, a
problem arose. The UK was tabling the so-called “Edenplan”, by which the Council of
Ministers and the Common Assembly of the ECSC would function as a kind of inner circle
of the Committee of Ministers and the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe.
They had to decide which institution would be entitled to deal with the UK and with the
Council of Europe.13 Since the Treaty did not address this issue, the ECSC turned to three
prominent international lawyers, Maître Reuter, Professor Ophüls and Professor Rossi, who
concluded that the High Authority would conduct the negotiations on these matters when
they affected the institutional organization of the ECSC.
The invitation from the U.S. to the High Authority to visit Washington in the summer of
1953 also contributed to the establishment of the ECSC’s international position. The thenPresident of the High Authority and two of his advisers accepted the invitation, meeting with
President Eisenhower and members of his cabinet, as well as with influential members of
Congress. The U.S. was already supporting European efforts towards integrated policies, of

11

Wellenstein, E. “Twenty-Five Years of European Community External Relations,” CMLRev 16 (1979), p.
408.
12
Stelios Castanos, Principes et Problèmes de Relations Internationales Européennes (1965).
13
Werner J. Feld, The European Community in World Affairs. Economic Power and Political Influence, (1976).
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which the ECSC was a shining example.14 During this period, the High Authority also
negotiated the Association Agreement of 1954 with the UK, and other important
arrangements with Austria, Switzerland15 and Sweden on various issues relating to coal and
steel markets.
From there, the EC continued to increase its political efforts. The High Authority opened
a delegation at the ambassadorial level in London after the “Association Agreement” was
concluded with the UK, set up an Information Office in Washington and established a liaison
office for Latin America in Santiago, Chile.
B. 1958-1967: The Three Communities16 Working In Parallel

B.1.- Euratom In The External Policies Of The Communities

The second of the Treaties of Rome of 1957, which established the European Atomic Energy
Community (Euratom), played a vital role in the development of the Communities’ external
relations. Of the three treaties setting up the European Communities, including the EEC
Treaty, the Euratom Treaty contains the most comprehensive provisions for foreign
relations.17 The Euratom Treaty reads: “The Community may, within the limits of its powers
and jurisdiction, enter into obligations by concluding agreements or contracts with a third
State, an international organization or a national of a third State.”18

14

Werner Weidenfeld, America and Europe: Is the Break Inevitable? (1996).
Agreement on the introduction of through international railway tariffs for the carriage of coal and steel
through Swiss territory, 1957 O.J. (L 17) 223-229.
16
Let us remember the three Communities (now only two of them remain since 2002): European Coal and Steel
Community (ECSC), European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom), and European Economic Community
(EEC), which then became simply European Community (EC).
17
TEC, as amended by the TEU.
18
See Chapter X on External Relations, Article 101, para. 1 of the Euratom Treaty.
15
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Today, it is the Commission that negotiates and concludes such agreements, following
the directives given by the Council, except those which can be implemented without the
Council in the framework of the existing budget. Under the EC Treaty, however, the Council
concludes such agreements. Additional provisions address mixed agreements and limitations
on the treaty-making power of the Member States.
In the early years of Euratom, a number of important agreements concerning the supply
of enriched uranium and cooperation in the development of peaceful use of atomic energy
were signed with the U.S. and with Canada.19 Security played an important role in the
implementation of these agreements. The preservation of the control system at the
Community level necessitated successful negotiations during the late 1960s and early 1970s
with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)20 in Vienna and Brussels, which
resulted in the Agreement between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany,
Ireland, the Italian Republic, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the European Community for
Atomic Energy and the IAEA in application of paragraphs 1 and 4 of Article III of the Treaty
on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.21
The implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons required
control arrangements that came into existence in the so-called “Verification Agreement”
between Euratom, some of its Member States and the IAEA. It was a mixed agreement based
19

Stanley Henig, External Relations of the European Community. Associations and Trade Agreements, (1971).
Agreement between the Government of Canada and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) for
cooperation in the peaceful uses of atomic energy, 1959 O.J. (L 60) 1165.
20
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was established as an autonomous organization on July 29,
1957. It seeks to promote the peaceful use of nuclear energy and to inhibit its use for military purposes. U.S.
President Eisenhower envisioned, in his “Atoms for Peace” speech before the UN General Assembly in 1953,
the creation of this international body to control and develop the use of atomic energy. The IAEA has its
headquarters in Vienna. Two "Regional Safeguards Offices" are located in Toronto and Tokyo. The IAEA has
two liaison offices, located in New York and Geneva. In addition, it has laboratories in Seibersdorf, Vienna,
Monaco, and Trieste.
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on Article 102 of the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community.22 The
provisions of the Euratom Treaty, as well as the main agreements concluded in the late 1950s
on that basis, still had importance in the late 1970s for the external policy of the
Community.23

B.2.- The Emergence Of The EEC As A Major Negotiating Partner In World Affairs

In the European Coal and Steel Community Treaty (ECSC Treaty), the idea of a common
market is based on “harmonized” tariffs, where the tariffs of Member States may not differ
more than the cost of transport between their territories. However, the EEC, as a customs
union,24 had a full-fledged common tariff25 and common commercial policy,26 as well as
provisions concerning negotiations of the common tariff and common commercial policy
with third countries. After the transitional period, decisions on these matters are taken by the
Council and proposed by the Commission by qualified majority, though in the beginning the
decisions had to be unanimous.
What characterizes the EEC Treaty is its wide coverage of both the range of products and
various policies, and the institutions can create new policies. Even before the merger of the

21

Agreement between Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the European
Atomic Energy Community and the International Atomic Energy Agency in implementation of Articles III (1)
and (4) of the Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, 1978 O.J. (L 51) 1.
22
Michael Smith & Stephen Woolcock, The United States and the European Community in a Transformed
World (1993).
23
Id.
24
On July 1, 1968 a customs union was set in place. From that day, goods can move within the European
Community without being taxed and are no longer subject to customs duties. A common customs tariff toward
third countries was therefore established by the then EC’s six Member States.
25
Article 131 EC, as amended by the TEU.
26
Id., at Arts. 131 & 133.
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Councils and Commissions of the three Communities in 1965,27 the world viewed the EEC as
a general integrative undertaking, able to use political weight to solve problems.28 Euratom
alone would not have had the strength to convey the same political message. However, the
EEC, with Euratom as a component, had a considerable impact on world affairs.29 During
this period, third countries gained interest in joining the EEC. Greece was the first to ask for
an association agreement in 1961,30 with an intention of membership. Next came Turkey31 in
1963, and then Israel.
There were also those who tried to neutralize what they saw as the potential negative
effects of these new Communities on their own position. The UK and other non-EEC
European States worked together for the creation of a free trade area32 within the framework
27

The merger of the European Communities' executive bodies took place on April 8, 1965. Since then, there has
been only one Council and a single Commission. The entry into force of the Merger Treaty was on July 1, 1967
and Jean Rey became the first President of the “merged” Commission.
28
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND GATT (Meinhard Hilf et al. eds., 1986).
29
CHRISTOPHER PIENING, GLOBAL EUROPE: THE EUROPEAN UNION IN WORLD AFFAIRS (1997).
30
Agreement establishing an association between the European Economic Community and Greece, 1963 O.J.
(L 26) 294.
31
Agreement establishing an Association between the European Economic Community and Turkey, 1964 O.J.
(L 217) 3685, 3705.
32
This means a group of countries that have removed barriers to trade among them –barriers such as import
tariffs and quotas-. Several free trade areas have been established around the world: Mercosur in South
America, NAFTA in North America, CAFTA in Central America, ASEAN in South-East Asia, and EFTA in
Europe, for example. The European Union is also a free trade area, but it is much more than that because it is
built on a process of economic and political integration, with joint decision-taking in many policy areas.
Not everyone agrees with the creation of free trade areas. In North America, for instance, the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was a radical experiment in rapid deregulation of trade and
investment among the U.S, Mexico, and Canada. Since 1995, NAFTA is considered the symbol of the failed
corporate globalization model because its results for most people in all three countries have been negative: real
wages are lower and millions of jobs have been lost; farm income is down and farm bankruptcies are up;
environmental and health conditions along the U.S.-Mexico boarder have declined; and a series of
environmental and other public interest standards have been attacked under NAFTA. NAFTA’s agricultural
provisions have been so extreme that Mexican family farmers are demanding a re-negotiation or nullification of
the treaty, after its first phase of initial implementation led to displacement of millions of Mexican farmers.
NAFTA represents the gold standard of corporate rights in trade and investment agreements because it includes
hitherto unheard of corporate privileges, including investor-to-state dispute resolutions, which is the right to sue
governments for cash compensation in closed trade tribunals over regulatory costs. This right, contained in
NAFTA’s chapter 11 on investment, has been used by numerous multinational corporations to seek financial
compensation for public health and safety, or environmental regulations that corporations argue amount to
expropriation of their current or future lost profits. NAFTA chapter 11 corporate suits have resulted in the
lifting of a Canadian ban on a toxic chemical as well as an attack on a similar California state toxic chemical
ban, and the payout of U.S. $16 million by waste dump to be built on ecologically protected land.

11

Rafael Leal-Arcas

of the Organization for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC).33 This failed, and a
smaller free trade area (European Free Trade Association [EFTA])34 came into existence.
There were also those countries that supported the process of Community construction from
without.35 For example, the U.S. considered the process a major contribution to the stability
and prosperity of the world. Finally, there were those like the former U.S.S.R. that
condemned this revival of European dynamism as detrimental to the peaceful coexistence of
sovereign nations.36
There are several Articles in the EEC Treaty that promote greater common action. For
example, ex-Article 116 EEC reads:

From the end of the transitional period onwards, Member States shall, in
respect of all matters of particular interest to the common market, proceed within the
framework of international organizations of an economic character only by common
action. To this end, the Commission shall submit to the Council, which shall act by a

33

The OEEC is the forerunner of the OECD. The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) is an international organization of those developed countries that accept the principles of representative
democracy and a free market economy. It originated in 1948 as the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), led by Frenchman Robert Marjolin, to help administer the Marshall Plan for the reconstruction of Europe after World War II. Later its membership was extended to non-European states, and in
1960 it was reformed into the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development. The organization
provides a setting where governments can compare policy experiences, seek answers to common problems,
identify good practice, and co-ordinate domestic and international policies. It is a forum where peer pressure
can act as a powerful incentive to improve policy and implement "soft law" — non-binding instruments that can
occasionally lead to binding treaties. Exchanges between OECD governments flow from information and
analysis provided by a secretariat in Paris. The secretariat collects data, monitors trends, and analyses and
forecasts economic developments. It also researches social changes or evolving patterns in trade, environment,
agriculture, technology, taxation, and other areas. Over the past decade, the OECD has tackled a range of
economic, social and environmental issues while further deepening its engagement with business, trade unions
and other representatives of civil society. Negotiations at the OECD on taxation and transfer pricing, for
example, have paved the way for bilateral tax treaties around the world. Among other areas, the OECD has
taken a role in co-ordinating international action on corruption and bribery, creating the OECD Anti-Bribery
Convention, which came into effect in February 1999.
34
The EFTA is an organization founded in 1960 to promote free trade in goods amongst its member states.
There were originally seven EFTA countries: Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, and
the United Kingdom (UK). Finland joined in 1961, Iceland in 1970, and Liechtenstein in 1991. In 1973,
Denmark and the UK left EFTA and joined the EC. They were followed by Portugal in 1986, and by Austria,
Finland and Sweden in 1995. Today the EFTA members are Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland.
35
PETER STINGELIN, THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND THE OUTSIDERS (1973).
36
Id.
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qualified majority, proposals concerning the scope and implementation of such
common action.
During the transitional period, Member States shall consult each other for the
purpose of concerting the action they take and adopting as far as possible a uniform
attitude.37

Ex-Article 116 obliges Member States to act in concert when matters of particular
interest to the common market arise in international economic organizations. Article 300
EC38 is a general provision concerning the procedures for negotiation and conclusion of

37

The original text of Article 116 EEC was repealed by the Treaty of Maastricht. Article 116 remained “empty”
until the Treaty of Amsterdam, which inserted a new text for Article 116 EC but also renumbered this Article as
Article 135 EC. Therefore, the present text for Article 135 EC (ex-Article 116) is not the original Article 116
EEC.
38
Article 300 EC reads:
1. Where this Treaty provides for the conclusion of agreements between the Community and one or more
States or international organisations, the Commission shall make recommendations to the Council, which shall
authorise the Commission to open the necessary negotiations. The Commission shall conduct these negotiations
in consultation with special committees appointed by the Council to assist it in this task and within the
framework of such directives as the Council may issue to it.
In exercising the powers conferred upon it by this paragraph, the Council shall act by a qualified majority,
except in the cases where the first subparagraph of paragraph 2 provides that the Council shall act unanimously.
2. Subject to the powers vested in the Commission in this field, the signing, which may be accompanied by a
decision on provisional application before entry into force, and the conclusion of the agreements shall be
decided on by the Council, acting by a qualified majority on a proposal from the Commission. The Council
shall act unanimously when the agreement covers a field for which unanimity is required for the adoption of
internal rules and for the agreements referred to in Article 310.
By way of derogation from the rules laid down in paragraph 3, the same procedures shall apply for a decision to
suspend the application of an agreement, and for the purpose of establishing the positions to be adopted on
behalf of the Community in a body set up by an agreement, when that body is called upon to adopt decisions
having legal effects, with the exception of decisions supplementing or amending the institutional framework of
the agreement.
The European Parliament shall be immediately and fully informed of any decision under this paragraph
concerning the provisional application or the suspension of agreements, or the establishment of the Community
position in a body set up by an agreement.
3. The Council shall conclude agreements after consulting the European Parliament, except for the agreements
referred to in Article 133(3), including cases where the agreement covers a field for which the procedure
referred to in Article 251 or that referred to in Article 252 is required for the adoption of internal rules. The
European Parliament shall deliver its opinion within a time limit which the Council may lay down according to
the urgency of the matter. In the absence of an opinion within that time limit, the Council may act.
By way of derogation from the previous subparagraph, agreements referred to in Article 310, other agreements
establishing a specific institutional framework by organising cooperation procedures, agreements having
important budgetary implications for the Community and agreements entailing amendment of an act adopted
under the procedure referred to in Article 251 shall be concluded after the assent of the European Parliament has
been obtained.
The Council and the European Parliament may, in an urgent situation, agree upon a time limit for the assent.
4. When concluding an agreement, the Council may, by way of derogation from paragraph 2, authorise the
Commission to approve modifications on behalf of the Community where the agreement provides for them to
be adopted by a simplified procedure or by a body set up by the agreement; it may attach specific conditions to
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agreements with third-countries or with international organizations, where the Commission
acts as the negotiator and the Council as the “concluder.”39 It also opens the possibility of
asking for a preliminary opinion from the European Court of Justice (ECJ). Ex-Article 237
EC Treaty,40 concerning enlargement of the Community, and Article 310 EC,41 concerning
“associations,” are both characterized by mutual rights and duties, common actions and
special procedures.42
Before the Treaties of Rome were ratified, the six Member States at the time (i.e., West
Germany, France, Italy, The Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg) had to prepare for
negotiations within the GATT framework.43 The EEC was quickly engaged in various
negotiations, and the implementation of the transitional provisions of the Treaty required
enormous efforts from the Institutions, which also had to deal with proposals from outside
the EEC. Among these initiatives that arose in the following years were four applications for
membership, three from the group that had previously formed the European Free Trade
Association, and Ireland. This intense international activity during the first years of the EEC
was focused on the common external tariff. Ex-Article 111 of the Treaty44 gave the

such authorisation.
5. When the Council envisages concluding an agreement which calls for amendments to this Treaty, the
amendments must first be adopted in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 48 of the Treaty on
European Union.
6. The European Parliament, the Council, the Commission or a Member State may obtain the opinion of the
Court of Justice as to whether an agreement envisaged is compatible with the provisions of this Treaty. Where
the opinion of the Court of Justice is adverse, the agreement may enter into force only in accordance with
Article 48 of the Treaty on European Union.
7. Agreements concluded under the conditions set out in this Article shall be binding on the institutions of the
Community and on Member States.
39
LAWMAKING IN THE EUROPEAN UNION (Paul Craig & Carol Harlow eds., 1998).
40
TEC ex Article 237 (repealed), as amended by the TEU.
41
Id., at Article 310 EC, which reads: The Community may conclude with one or more States or international
organisations agreements establishing an association involving reciprocal rights and obligations, common action
and special procedure.
42
THE EVOLUTION OF EU LAW (Paul Craig & Grainne de Burca eds., 1999).
43
61 Stat. A3, TIAS No. 1700, 55 UNTS 187.
44
TEC ex-art. 111 (repealed), as amended by the TEU.
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Community the express task of negotiating this common tariff. Concessions on future
common customs duties of the single market also led to important offers from the U.S.45 The
use of the EEC, rather than individual member states, facilitated reductions of trade barriers.
From the perspective of international economic relations, perhaps the most interesting
arrangements made by the High Authority during its period of independent activity were the
successful consultations with Japan on the world steel market in the early 1960s. Around
1964, the steel market entered a difficult period, with risks of dangerous protectionist
reactions coming from the U.S.46 During the late 1950s and early 1960s, the specific powers
of the High Authority in the field of commercial policy were first used in practice.47
In sum, the Community was founded to create a framework within which the economies
of the Member States could develop beyond their national borders and to promote stability in
the world. The preambles of the treaties of Paris and Rome give an idea of the very wide
objectives that the founders of the EEC had in mind. The place that their creation now
occupies in the world lays enormous responsibilities on the institutions. Without the
constructive contributions of the EC, many world problems could simply not find an
appropriate solution.

C.- 1967-1977: The Period Of The “Merger”, The End Of The Transitional Period Of
The EEC, And The Transitional Period After The First Enlargement

45

Wellenstein, E. “Twenty-Five Years of European Community External Relations”, 16 COMMON MKT. L.
REV., 1979, pp. 407-423, at 413.
46
STEPHEN WOOLCOCK, TRADING PARTNERS OR TRADING BLOWS? MARKET ACCESS ISSUES
IN EC-U.S. RELATIONS (1991).
47
WILLIAM FELD, THE EUROPEAN COMMON MARKET AND THE WORLD (1967).
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A brief note should be made on the evolution of the concept of “commercial policy” as used
in Article 133 of the EC Treaty. At the time of the Treaty of Rome, the common commercial
policy did not mean trade in services, intellectual property rights or investment; it just meant
trade in goods. That is the explanation for the raison d’etre of the ECJ’s Opinion 1/94.
Article 133 EC lists several examples of commercial policy, such as tariff changes
and liberalization,48 and national administrations have tended to illogically limit the
application of the Article to the examples given above. However, from Article 133 EC we
can deduce that the enumeration is not meant to be exhaustive and among the examples
listed, there is one with the general wording “export policy.”49 In addition, there are many
examples of commercial policy outside of those listed in Article 133 EC. The rationale of the
common commercial policy is to form the external dimension of the creation of a common
market, but a Community that would deprive itself of those possibilities would weaken its
position in relation to other entities.
The scope of “commercial policy” became relevant on various occasions during the
1970s.50 An important case arose when a number of Western countries tried to introduce
more discipline into export credit policies with state backing. These policies risked
degenerating into a competition among the treasuries of different Western countries, with the
effect of providing highly industrialized states in Eastern Europe, for example, with credits
below the market rate. Was this, then, a matter for the Community or for Member States
individually? The European Commission seized the occasion of a rather minor provision
within the framework of the OECD to ask for an opinion from the Court under Article 300
48

TEC Art. 133, as amended by the TEU.
PROTECTIONISM AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (Edmond L. Völker ed., 1988).
50
PAUL DEMARET, RELATIONS EXTERIEURES DE LA COMMUNAUTE EUROPEENNE ET
49
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EC. The advisory Opinion 1/7551 left no doubt as to the “commercial policy nature” of such
export credit arrangements with state backing. History and evolving jurisprudence have
gradually provided a much clearer and more convincing outline of the concept of common
commercial policy.
The status of the so-called “cooperation” activities vis-à-vis Article 133 EC is another
issue of considerable importance. Member States can still sign individual cooperation
agreements (especially with East European countries), but since 1975 there has been an
obligation of full consultation on the practical application and terms. The EC can also
conclude agreements when cooperation is the primary concern. Commodity agreements are
also covered by the EC common commercial policy.
“During this period, the U.S. position as a global economic hegemony deteriorated
further in January 1973, when Britain, Denmark, and Ireland joined the EC, making it the
world’s largest trading entity.”52 The successful participation of the EEC in the greatest
multilateral trade negotiations of the time, the Kennedy Round of trade negotiations from
1963-1967, gave the EEC a very strong position in the international forum. The EC was the
first major trading entity in the Western world to implement the proposals for generalized
preferences adopted in 1968 at UNCTAD II53 in New Delhi. In addition, the executive
institutions of the three Communities were merged into a single Commission and a single
MARCHE INTERIEUR: ASPECTS JURIDIQUES ET FONCTIONNELS (1986).
51
Opinion 1/75, 1975 E.C.R. 1355.
52
Cohn, T.H. Governing Global Trade. International institutions in conflict and convergence, Ashgate, 2002, at
p. 281.
53
UNCTAD stands for United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, and was established in 1964 as
a permanent intergovernmental body. UNCTAD is the principal organ of the United Nations General Assembly
dealing with trade, investment, and development issues. The organization's goals are to maximize the trade,
investment, and development opportunities of developing countries and assist them in their efforts to integrate
into the world economy on an equitable basis. The creation of the conference was based on concerns of
developing countries over the international market, multi-national corporations, and great disparity between
developed nations and developing nations. Currently, UNCTAD has 191 member States and is headquartered in
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Council (1967) at this time. With the end of the transitional period in 1970,54 these merged
institutions would become responsible for the common commercial policy.55 Notably, this
was a time of negotiation between the EEC and many other countries and organizations,
which led to a variety of agreements.
In the field of the common commercial policy, authors such as Weiler argue against
the popular belief that the 1970s were nothing much to the history of European integration
and everything started after Casis de Dijon.56 During that time, the ECJ was the most
influential international/supranational court, the Commission was assuming its role of the
engine of the integration process and the European Parliament was requesting more
institutional powers. The Council found itself more and more restrained in the Community
game, probably against the original design of some Member States who regarded the EU
Council as an ultima ratio, a refuge of nationalism. However, the EC was established
originally on an unquestionable transfer of sovereignty57 from Member States to the EC,58

Geneva.
54
During the transitional period, the EEC was competent to conclude tariff agreements linked to the
establishment of the common custom tariff. The Member States had to coordinate their trade relations with third
countries. To this end, the EEC decided to insert an EEC clause in the trade agreements, and establish a prior
consultation procedure. At the end of the transitional period, the Community became competent to conclude
tariff and trade agreements with third countries, except in certain cases, in accordance with Article 133 EC. The
EC common commercial policy is based on uniform principles, especially concerning tariff and trade
agreements, harmonization of liberalization measures, export policy, and measure of trade defense. The EC’s
trade policy has two distinct forms:
1. autonomous: unilateral measures decided by the EC. For example, regulations on imports or the fight
against antidumping;
2. conventional: agreements and arrangements concluded by the EC with third countries. The doctrine,
and especially the EU Member States, has rallied either under a strict conception of the common
commercial policy, on the basis of the terms laid down in Article 133 EC, or under a modern and
extensive conception.
55
On December 31, 1970 was the end of the transitional period. The EC Member States introduced a common
commercial policy. Also on this date, the finance of the EC budget by means of financial contributions from EC
Member States was replaced by a system of own resources, which meant much greater freedom of action for the
EC vis-à-vis its Member States.
56
Case 120/78 REWE Central v Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein, [1979] ECR 649.
57
Sovereignty is one of the most used and misused concepts of international affairs and international law.
Sometimes, it refers to the role of states in international organizations. Other times, it refers to internal division
of power, or the degree of government authority toward its citizens. Richard N. Haass has defined sovereignty
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with only the doctrine of implied powers as a caveat. Provisions that do not specify exactly
what has been transferred to the EC, such as Article 308 EC,59 nevertheless constitute an
explicit limitation of national sovereignty.60
EC external relations are not limited to the field of trade policy. The Treaty is not
very explicit about these other dimensions, but the European Court of Justice has attempted
to clarify them. In the famous European Road Transport Agreement (ERTA) case on road
transportation (Case 22/70, Commission v. Council),61 the Court ruled that a matter already
regulated by the EU institutions could not be dealt with internationally without Community
participation and approval, precisely because it has been regulated by an EU institution.
External activity can take three main forms: 1) autonomous legislation, to set out rules for
relations for the outside world; 2) negotiation, to arrive at agreements with third parties; and
3) dialogue, to gain a better understanding of other parties in order to better determine their
own attitudes.62 It was the dialogue that gained importance in the late 1970s.

in the following manner: "Historically, sovereignty has been associated with four main characteristics: First, a
sovereign state is one that enjoys supreme political authority and monopoly over the legitimate use of force
within its territory. Second, it is capable of regulating movements across its borders. Third, it can make its
foreign policy choices freely. Finally, it is recognized by other governments as an independent entity entitled to
freedom from external intervention. These components of sovereignty were never absolute, but together they
offered a predictable foundation for world order. What is significant today is that each of these components –
internal authority, border control, policy autonomy, and non-intervention – is being challenged in
unprecedented ways." (See, in this respect, Haass's remarks at the School of Foreign Service and the Mortara
Center for International Studies, Georgetown University, entitled: "Sovereignty: Existing Rights, Evolving
Responsibilities," on January 14, 2003). Most of the time, though, sovereignty actually refers to questions about
the allocation of power, i.e., government decision-making power.
58
Case 6/64 Costa v ENEL [1964] ECR 585 is a clear example of transfer of sovereignty to the EC, although
limited.
59
Article 308 EC reads: If action by the Community should prove necessary to attain, in the course of the
operation of the common market, one of the objectives of the Community, and this Treaty has not provided the
necessary powers, the Council shall, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after
consulting the European Parliament, take the appropriate measures.
60
Mavroidis, P. “Lexcalibur: The House that Joe Built”, Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, Vol. 38,
2000, Number 3, p. 673.
61
Commission v. Council, Case 22/70, 1971 E.C.R. 263.
62
Jacques H.J. Bourgeois, External Relations Powers of the European Community, 22 FORDHAM INT’L L.J.
149 (1999).

19

Rafael Leal-Arcas

In this context, we see that the EU now has diplomatic delegations in many capitals as
well as in the U.N. headquarters (where it obtained official observer status in 1975). Since
1973, the EU has conducted a systematic dialogue with the U.S., Japan, Canada, Australia
and New Zealand, separate from the periodic discussions that take place regularly within the
OECD. Since 1977, the EU has also been involved in the economic world summits of the
seven major industrialized nations, the so-called G 7.63
Already in the late 1970s, the Community had become an important interlocutor, not
only in trade but also in areas such as energy, fisheries and development policies. The
Community was already a major actor in most world fora, often speaking with one voice,
even if some aspects of the debate were not under its direct competence. Examples of this
were the Conference on International Economic Cooperation (the so-called “North-South
Dialogue”) in Paris in 1976-1977, when the Community had one single delegation to cover
all points of the agenda, and the Euro-Arab dialogue.
During the period of the Tokyo Round (1973-1979), the U.S. continued to have much
influence in world trade. Some of the early initiatives toward the Tokyo Round came from
the American side such as the William Commission. That said, the EC and the U.S. held
informal discussions on various issues throughout the Tokyo Round to avoid major potential
confrontation. When the U.S. and EC did not cooperate, there was a deadlock in the
negotiations of the Tokyo Round since they had effective veto power. When the U.S. and the
EC adopted a unified position, the combined efforts of others had minor chances of changing
the outcome.64

63

The main difference between the G8 and the G7 (both coexist) is that the G8 deals with political matters and
includes Russia as a member, whereas the G7 is for economic matters, and Russia is excluded.
64
Golt, S. The GATT Negotiations 1973-1979: The Closing Stage, (London, British-North American
Committee), May 1978, p.1; Winham, “The Prenegotiation Phase of the Uruguay Round,” pp.289-290; Thomas,
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D.- Other Legal Bases for Trade Agreements

What follows are categories of international agreements that contain provisions on trade
despite the fact that they are not based on Article 133 EC. I will categorize the various
agreements into six main groups, namely, 1) development aid and cooperation agreements; 2)
association agreements; 3) non-preferential trade and cooperation agreements; 4) partnership
agreements; 5) agreements with international organizations; and 6) the implied powers
doctrine.

D.1.- Development Aid And Cooperation Agreements

The original Treaty of Rome65 contained guidelines about external relations. First of all, the
treaty established a special regime for development aid and cooperation, which initially aided
developing countries that had a long-standing relationship (mostly former colonies) with
founding Member States. This regime was further developed through the Yaoundé and Lomé
Conventions, which linked 70 developing countries to the EC.
In this sense, we see that one of the main reasons for international negotiations
between the EEC and third-parties was the historic link between the different Member States
of the EC and overseas territories or dependencies. Shortly after the establishment of the
EEC, there was an important transformation in the links between these countries and the
J.C. “The GATT and Multilateral Treaty Making: The Tokyo Round,” American Journal of International Law
77 (1983), pp. 70-71.
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Common Market, which, according to Part IV of the EEC Treaty, consisted of a two-way
free access for each other’s products and a special Community aid program. To address the
issue of access for these countries, the Yaoundé Convention was held.66
The Yaoundé Convention took place with eighteen African States and Madagascar.67
After the first enlargement of the Community, the whole system was renegotiated
(1973/1974) with nearly 50 countries (all the former dependencies of the UK in Africa, the
Pacific and the Caribbean). In 1975 the Lomé Convention, between the Community and this
group of countries, introduced new ideas such as the organization of commercial and
industrial cooperation and the stabilization of export earnings.68
The Yaoundé Conventions linked the EC to African States, providing, inter alia,
financial and technical assistance for economic development. Two important examples are
the Convention of Association between the EEC and Associated African States, of July 20,
196369 and the Convention of Association between the EEC and Associated African States,
of July 29, 1969.70 With reference to the Lomé Conventions, there have been four additional
agreements negotiated, the European Economic Community-African, Caribbean and Pacific
Countries Convention (EEC-ACP Convention), of February 28, 1975,71 the second ACP-

65

Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community [TEEC].
It was on January 1, 1971 that the Second Yaoundé Convention entered into force (18 African countries), as
well as the Arusha Convention (three Eastern African countries) and the Council Decision concerning the
association of the EC Member States’ overseas territories.
67
For example, an agreement between the European Economic Community and the Government of the
Democratic Republic of Madagascar regarding fishing off the coast of Madagascar was signed some years later
(OJ L 73/86, p. 25).
68
It was on February 28, 1975 that the signature of the so-called Lomé I took place between the European
Community and 46 ACP countries.
69
2 I.L.M. 971 (1970).
70
9 I.L.M. 484 (1970).
71
14 I.L.M. 596 (1985). The African, Caribbean and Pacific countries (ACP) Group was formed when the first
Lomé Convention was signed with the EEC in 1975. In 2002, it encompassed 78 states (48 African states, 16
Caribbean states, 14 Pacific states), which all have preferential trading relation with the EC.
66

22

Rafael Leal-Arcas

EEC Convention, of October 31, 1979,72 the third ACP-EEC Convention, of December 8,
1984,73 and the fourth ACP-EEC Convention, of December 1, 1989.74 Thanks to these
Conventions, over 99% of these countries’ imports enjoy free access to the EU.
The status of so-called “cooperation” activities vis-à-vis Article 133 EC is an issue of
considerable importance. Member States can still sign individual cooperation agreements
(especially with East European countries), but since 1975 there has been an obligation of full
consultation on the practical application and terms. The EC can also conclude that
agreements when cooperation is the primary concern. Commodity agreements are covered by
the common commercial policy.
With respect to industrialized nations, in 1976, the Community signed with Canada the
first bilateral agreement with an industrialized nation outside Europe. Because trade policy
between developed countries is covered by the GATT, it was simply a cooperation
agreement.75

D.2.- Association Agreements

The Treaty of Rome also provided for the conclusion of association agreements under Article
310 EC.76 Agreements with various degrees of commitment and different economic and

72

19 I.L.M. 327 (1985).
24 I.L.M. 571 (1985).
74
Fourth ACP-EEC Convention signed at Lome, 1991 O.J. (L 229) 3.
75
Council Regulation 2300/76, 1976 O.J. (L 260) 1 (Framework Agreement for commercial and economic
cooperation between the European Communities and Canada).
76
In addition to the typical cooperation agreements in economic and commercial matters and development aid,
the EC concluded association agreements with certain third countries geographically close to the European area,
establishing extensive relations in economic matters (Article 310 EC). Countries which today are EU Member
States, such as Greece, Spain, and Portugal, have benefited from such agreements prior to joining the EU.
Today, Turkey is associated to the EC by such agreements (in 1963, Association Agreement; in 1995, Customs
Union Agreement). Other examples of Association Agreements – or of similar nature - are with Chile and
73
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political purposes have been concluded with almost every country, except for some of the
most developed countries like the U.S., Japan, and Australia. These Association Agreements
represent the closest relationship with the EC and usually involve some kind of reciprocal
obligation. Agreements with countries of the European Economic Area,77 the Mediterranean
Agreements,78 the Europe Agreements with Central and Eastern European countries,79 and
the Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements fall within this category. Though most
mixed agreements involve just the EC (with the Member States, obviously), agreements
involving the EC and the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) were not rare at the
time when the ECSC existed. In this sense, we find many association agreements in the EC
legislation. However, agreements involving all three original Communities80 were
uncommon. Examples of this are some of the regional environmental agreements.
The Europe Agreements are a series of association agreements with various Central
European countries pursuant to the authority granted in Article 310 EC.81 Among them are
the Europe (association) Agreement between the European Communities and the Republic of
Mexico, and in the future with Mercosur (since 2000, the EC and the Mercosur are in the process of negotiating
a bi-regional Association Agreement, including a free trade area) and the Andean Community.
77
Council and Commission Decision 94/1/EC, ECSC, 1994 O.J. (L 1) 1 (on the conclusion of the Agreement on
the European Economic Area between the European Communities, their Member States and the Republic of
Austria, the Republic of Finland, the Republic of Iceland, the Principality of Liechtenstein, the Kingdom of
Norway, the Kingdom of Sweden and the Swiss Confederation).
78
Council Regulation 2213/78, 1978 O.J. (L 266) 1 (on the conclusion of the Cooperation Agreement between
the European Economic Community and the Arab Republic of Egypt); Council Regulation 150/77, 1977 O.J. (L
23) 13 (concluding the Agreement in the form of an Exchange of Letters relating to Article 9 of Protocol 1 to
the Agreement between the European Economic Community and the State of Israel concerning the import into
the Community of tomato paste originating in Israel).
79
These specific types of Association Agreements were concluded between the EC and the countries of Central
and Eastern Europe in the first half of the 1990’s. They cover trade-related issues, political dialogue, legal
approximation and various other areas of co-operation. The Europe Agreements aimed to establish free trade
between the EC and the associated countries, and provided for progressive alignment with Community rules as
well as a number of specific provisions in areas such as capital movement, rules of competition, intellectual and
industrial property rights, and public procurement.
80
The original European Communities were composed of: European Coal and Steel Community –by the Treaty
of Paris, 1952; European Economic Community –by the Treaty of Rome, 1957, which in 1992 was renamed as
European Community; and European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) –by the Treaty of Rome, 1957.
81
Roger Goebel, The European Community and Eastern Europe: Deepening and Widening the Community
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Bulgaria,82 the Europe (association) Agreement between the European Communities and
their Member States and the Czech Republic,83 and the Europe (association) Agreement
between the European Communities and their Member States and the Republic of Hungary.84
Negotiations were conducted with communist and formerly communist countries. In
early 1978 a trade agreement was concluded with China and in 1985, a Trade and Economic
Cooperation Agreement between the EEC and the People’s Republic of China85 replaced the
previous Commercial Agreement of April 3, 1975. However, with China, and the former
U.S.S.R. and its allies, the EC had no official dealings. Today, all of the Eastern European
countries have arrangements with the EC on agricultural, steel and textile products, inter alia.
Romania was the first country to approach the EC and was granted special treatment for
some of its exports under the generalized scheme of preferences in 1974. A more recent
agreement with Romania is the Additional Protocol to the Europe Agreement on Trade in
Textile Products between the EEC and Romania.86
Before the merger of the institutions mentioned above, the EC composed of the original
six Member States (West Germany, France, Italy, The Netherlands, Belgium and
Luxembourg) was involved in a series of individual and collective negotiations.87 For
example, the Association Agreements for future membership were concluded in 1961 with
Greece88 and in 1963 with Turkey.89 Negotiations with the UK and other Western European

Brand of Economic Federalism”, 1 NEW EUR. L. REV. 163, 218-23 (1993).
82
Council and Commission Decision 94/908/EC, ECSC, Euratom, 1994 O.J. (L 358) 1.
83
Council and Commission Decision 94/910/EC, ECSC, Euratom, 1994 O.J. (L 360) 1.
84
Council and Commission Decision 93/742/Euratom, ECSC, EC, 1993 O.J. (L 347) 1.
85
Council Regulation 2616/85, 1985 O.J. (L 250) 1.
86
Additional Protocol to the Europe Agreement on Trade in textile products between the European Economic
Community and Romania, 1994 O.J. (L 123) 476.
87
JAMES JAY ALLEN, EUROPEAN COMMON MARKET AND THE GATT (1960).
88
Agreement establishing an association between the European Economic Community and Greece, 1963 O.J.
(L 26) 294.
89
Agreement establishing an association between the European Economic Community and Turkey, 1964 O.J.
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countries during the 1960s for membership and special relations with the EC did not end in
agreements. Negotiations with Austria continued during this period and talks with Israel90
and Spain were taken up, leading to agreements with the latter country before the end of
1960s. When the UK, Ireland, and Denmark joined the EC in 1973, the enlarged Community
(the three Member States which joined in 1973 plus the original six) entered into free trade
agreements with the remaining members of EFTA, Austria, Switzerland,91 Sweden,
Iceland,92 and Portugal. Finland and Norway93 followed sometime later.
The Community has also signed agreements with a number of Mediterranean countries.
Some of these countries received special treatment from the Community because of their
historic link with European countries.94 For example, see the Cooperation Agreement
between the EEC and the People’s Democratic Republic of Algeria,95 the Cooperation
Agreement between the EEC and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan,96 the Cooperation
Agreement between the EEC and the Lebanese Republic,97 the Cooperation Agreement
between the EEC and the Kingdom of Morocco,98 the Cooperation Agreement between the
EEC and the Syrian Arab Republic99 and the Cooperation Agreement between the EEC and

(L 217) 3685, 3705.
90
Agreement between the European Economic Community and Israel, 1975 O.J. (L 136) 1 (signed on May 11,
1975, this was a free trade and cooperation agreement).
91
Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Swiss Confederation on the application of
the rules of Community transit, 1972 O.J. (L 294) 1.
92
Agreement establishing a free trade area between the European Economic Community and the Republic of
Iceland, 1972 O.J. (L 301) 1.
93
Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Kingdom of Norway and provisions for its
implementation, 1973 O.J. (L 171) 2.
94
Wellenstein, E. “Twenty-Five Years of European Community External Relations”, 16 COMMON MKT. L.
REV., 1979, pp. 407-423, at 413.
95
Council Regulation 2210/78, 1978 O.J. (L 263) 1.
96
Council Regulation 2215/ 78, 1978 O.J. (L 268) 1.
97
Commission Decision 78/992/EEC, 1978 O.J. (L 267) 1.
98
Council Regulation 2211/78, 1978 O.J. (L 264) 1.
99
Council Regulation 2216/78, 1978 O.J. (L 269) 1.
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the Republic of Tunisia.100 During this period, the “global Mediterranean policy” was
created. This nomenclature is not very precise since it suggests that all of these agreements
were similar, but the agreements were very different from those completed between 1973 and
1975.
D.3.- Non-Preferential Trade And Cooperation Agreements

In contrast to the association agreements, the “non-preferential trade and cooperation
agreements” provide closer relationships between the EU and many countries of Southeast
Asia and Latin America. These agreements are usually aimed at lesser-developed countries.
Examples of cooperation agreements101 are the one signed with the Andean Pact (today
Andean Community)102 as well as with ASEAN (Association of South-East Asian
Nations)103 in 1980. Agreements were also designed to help some Asian countries address
problems arising from the loss of certain preferences from the Commonwealth.104 This was
the case with India,105 Pakistan,106 Sri Lanka,107 and Bangladesh.108

100

Council Regulation 2212/78, 1978 O.J. (L265) 1.
Proposal for a Council Decision concerning the conclusion of Framework Agreement for cooperation
between the European Economic Community and the Andean Pact, 1993 O.J. (C 25) 31.
102
The Andean Community is a trade bloc comprising until recently 5 South American countries: Venezuela,
Colombia, Peru, Ecuador, and Bolivia. In 2006, Venezuela announced its withdrawal, reducing the Andean
Community to 4 member states. The trade bloc was called the Andean Pact until 1996, and came into existence
with the signing of the Cartagena Agreement in 1969. Its headquarters are located in Lima, Peru.
103
ASEAN is composed of 10 members. The six Founding Countries of ASEAN are Malaysia, Indonesia, The
Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Brunei. The rest of countries are Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and Myanmar.
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In Latin America, agreements were concluded with Argentina,109 Uruguay,110 Brazil,111
and Mexico.112 There was also, inter alia, the Interregional Framework Cooperation
Agreement between the EC and its Member States and the Southern Cone Common Market
(Mercosur),113 as well as the Framework Agreement for Cooperation between the EEC and
the Federal Republic of Brazil.114 Regarding preferential access to the Community’s markets,
it must be said that Iran requested such a negotiation, but the response was less than positive.
There is also an Agreement between the EEC and Malaysia on trade in textile products115 and
a Cooperation Agreement between the EEC and Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines,
Singapore and Thailand, all member countries of the Association of South East Asian
Nations.116

D.4.- Partnership Agreements
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1976 O.J. (L 319) 1.
109
Council Decision 90/530/EEC, 1990 O.J. (L 295) 66 (concerning the conclusion of the Framework
Agreement for trade and economic Cooperation between the European Economic Community and the
Argentine Republic).
110
Agreement in the form of an exchange of letters between the European Economic Community and the
Eastern Republic of Uruguay on trade in mutton and lamb, 1980 O.J. (L 275) 37.
111
Council Decision 91/64/EEC, 1991 O.J. (L 40) 39 (concerning the conclusion of the Agreement between the
European Economic Community and the Federal Republic of Brazil on trade of textile products).
112
Council Decision 87/504/EEC, 1987 O.J. (L 292) 73 (Agreement in the form of an exchange of letters
between the European Economic Community and the United States of Mexico on trade of textile products).
113
Proposal for a Council Decision concerning the conclusion of the interregional framework cooperation
Agreement between the European Community and its Member States, of the one part, and the Southern Cone
Common Market and its member countries, of the other part, 1996 O.J. (C 14) 3; see also Council Decision
96/205/EC, 1996 O.J. (L 69) 1 (concerning the provisional application of certain provisions of the Interregional
Framework Cooperation Agreement between the European Community and its Member States, of the one part,
and the Southern Common Market and its Party States, of the other part). MERCOSUR stands for Mercado
Comun del Sur (Common Market of the Southern Cone) and is composed of Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay, and
Uruguay. On 9 December 2005, Venezuela was accepted as a new member, but it will be officialized in late
2006. It was founded in 1991 by the Treaty of Asuncion, which was later amended and updated by the 1994
Treaty of Ouro Preto. Its purpose is to promote free trade and the fluid movement of goods, peoples, and
currency.
114
Council Decision 95/445/EC, 1995 O.J. (L 262) 53.

28

Rafael Leal-Arcas

The EC has developed a hybrid of “partnership agreements,” which share features of
cooperation accords and Europe agreements to manage its relations with the successor States
of the former U.S.S.R. One example is the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between
the European Communities and their Member States and the Russian Federation.117

D.5.- Agreements With International Organizations

The Community’s role in the UNCTAD negotiations was less satisfactory than its fully
integrated stand in the GATT.118 This is due to the application of Article 116 EC,119 which is
far more complicated than that of Article 133 EC.120 There was also a general problem with
the position of the EC (Commission) representatives in international organizations, especially
those of the U.N. family. Since at that time only states could be members of these
organizations, the Commission’s representatives had many difficulties in international
negotiations. Whatever their constitutional powers may have been under EC law (like the
exclusive right to negotiate), the Commission’s representatives were at best “observers.”121
There were also problems at the European Conference on Security and Cooperation.
The Commission’s representative had to find his place within the delegation of the Member
State exercising the Presidency of the EU Council. The conference began with a Dane
exercising the presidency and finished with an Italian. The primary goal for the Security
115
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Conference was to make clear in all statements and documents that certain matters simply
could not be addressed unless the Community, through its institutions, agreed to it. Even in
1967, this point made the U.S.S.R. give up its resistance to Community participation in the
international wheat agreement.

D.6.- Theory Of Implied Powers122

The sixth category which I would like to present deals with three groups: 1) the implicit123
and explicit124 attribution of external EC competences;125 2) the exclusive versus nonexclusive EC competences; and 3) the external versus internal EC competences.
The Community’s competence can arise by express conferment in a Treaty Article, or
by implication from a Treaty Article. In the former case, we speak of express powers,
whereas in the latter case, we speak of implied powers of the Community.126 The doctrine of
implied powers developed in the jurisprudence of the ECJ ensured that the EC could enter
into agreements – within its internal competence - in areas beyond the original areas given by

(1997).
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For a useful and insightful analysis of implied competences and treaty-making powers, see de Witte, B. “The
Constitutional Law of External Relations,” in Pernice, I. & Maduro, M. (eds.) A Constitution for the European
Union: First Comments on the 2003-Draft of the European Convention, Nomos, 2003, pp. 95-106; see also,
Dashwood, A. “The Attribution of External Relations Competence,” in Dashwood, A. & Hillion, Ch. (eds.) The
General Law of EC External Relations, Sweet & Maxwell, 2000, pp. 115-38; Neuwahl, N. “The WTO Opinion
and Implied External Powers of the Community –A Hidden Agenda?,” in Dashwood, A. & Hillion, Ch. (eds.)
The General Law of EC External Relations, Sweet & Maxwell, 2000, pp. 139-51.
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125
There is a third type of power, which depends on the mode of attribution, i.e., subsidiary powers. This refers
to situations where the Community has no explicit or implicit powers to achieve a Treaty objective concerning
the single market. In such situations, Article 308 EC allows the Council, acting unanimously, to take the
measures it considers necessary.
126
Implied powers are often referred to as derived powers.

30

Rafael Leal-Arcas

the EC Treaty, namely the common commercial policy and association agreements. Although
the exact scope of the EC’s implied powers, and the nature of the competence which arose
from the operation of the principles developed by the ECJ were unclear and controversial,
matters have been clarified with case-law127 of the ECJ and substantive law. The Treaty of
Rome has resolved some of the contested points of legal theory in the doctrine of implied
powers, whereas the Maastricht Treaty has clarified matters by creating express powers to act
externally in a range of areas where previously such powers were of uncertain scope, or arose
only by implication.

D.6.a.- Implicit and Explicit Attribution of External EC Competences

This distinction deals only with the external EC competences. It results from the
interpretation given by the ECJ to the provisions of the Treaty in a constant case-law whose
main steps are, in the past, the ERTA principle128 and Opinion 1/76 (Rhine and Mosselle
Navigation Case)129 and, more recently, Opinions 2/91, 1/94 (Uruguay Round),130 and
Opinion 2/92 (OECD national treatment).131 The Court has decided in its Opinion 1/76 that
“competence to be internationally engaged can result not only from an explicit attribution by
the Treaty but also as an implicit consequence from its [the Treaty’s] provisions”132 “and
from acts taken, in the framework of these provisions, by the Community’s institutions.”133
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Two more points concerning this distinction between the implicit and explicit
attribution of EC external competences:
1.- among the explicitly attributed external competences, some are exclusive (mainly
Article 133 EC, dealing with the common commercial policy) and others are not (such as
Article 181 TEU, dealing with cooperation to development).
2.- among the implicitly attributed external competences, some are exclusive (see
ERTA case) and others are not. An example of implicitly attributed external competences
which are non-exclusive is the general principle by which a non-exclusive competence can
be exercised directly on the external sphere to conclude an international agreement without
any prior exercise on the internal sphere.

D.6.b.- Exclusive versus Non-Exclusive EC Competence in International Relations134

With respect to the EC position in international organizations, when a matter falls within the
exclusive competence of the EC, only the Community acts with regard to that matter on the
international level.135 Therefore, only the EC, not the Member States, expresses a position or
a vote on such matters. However, when the services of the Commission assure that the
content of an international agreement belongs to “Community competence”, do they mean
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A good article that deals with the exclusivity of Community competences vis-à-vis shared competences is:
Torrent, R. “Whom is the European Central Bank the Central Bank of?: Reaction to Zilioni and Selmayr”,
COMMON MKT. L. REV., 36, 1999, 1229-41, especially pp. 1236-38; see also, Kaniel, M. The Exclusive
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International, 1996; Tizzano, A. “Note in Tema di Relazioni Esterne dell’Unione Europea,” in Daniele, L. (ed.)
Le Relazioni Esterne dell’Unione Europea nel Nuovo Millennio, Giuffrè Editore, 2001, pp. 31-68.
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European Community’s exclusive competence or non-exclusive competence? This same
question could be addressed to civil servants, Community or national ones, who very often
use the expression “concerning the first pillar” to refer to works done in the framework of
ASEM meetings.136 These assertions have a completely different meaning depending on
whether we are dealing with exclusive or non-exclusive Community competence. In the
framework of exclusive competences, only the Community can act, whereas in the
framework of non-exclusive competences, if the Community does not act, Member States
may do so and, in certain cases, they may continue to act even if the Community also acts.

D.6.b.1.- Exclusive EC Competence
The case-law of the ECJ has established that the EC has exclusive competence in the field of
common commercial policy. Therefore, Member States are no longer competent to act in
areas dealing with common commercial policy. The Court clearly acknowledges in its
Opinion 1/75137 the exclusivity of the EC on the basis that the commercial policy was
conceived in the context of the common market and for the defence of the common interests
of the EC. The ECJ concluded that it could not be accepted that the Member States could
exercise powers which were concurrent with those of the EC in this field. As a logical
consequence, one could say that national commercial policy measures are only permissible
by virtue of specific authorization by the EC. As an example of it we have Case 41/76, Criel,
née Dockenwolcke et al. v. Procureur de la Republique au Tribunal de Grande Instance,

136
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ASEM meetings are held between the European Union and the Asian States.
Opinion 1/75, 1975 E.C.R. 1355, at 1363-4.
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Lille et al.138 The exclusive nature of the EC’s competence has most recently been confirmed
in Opinion 1/94.139
The main effect of exclusivity in EC competence is that Member States may no
longer act in the areas in which the EC has exclusive competence. The Court has pronounced
itself in this way in Opinion 1/75 (Re OECD Local Costs Standard) by saying that “the
exercise of concurrent powers by the Member States in this matter is impossible.”140 In Case
804/79 Commission v UK (which is not an external relations case), the ECJ expressed herself
in the same terms when saying that:

“the power to adopt measures…has belonged fully and definitively to the
Community. Member States are therefore no longer entitled to exercise any
power of their own in [these matters]. The adoption of…measures is a matter
of Community Law. The transfer to the Community of powers in this matter
being total and definitive,…a failure [of the Council] to act could not in any
case restore to the Member States the power and freedom to act unilaterally
in this field.” 141

In legal theory, the powers of the Member States have been transferred completely to
the EC level, and the Member States may not enter into any international agreements which
could affect measures adopted by the EC or change the scope of these measures. It must be
clarified, though, that the exclusivity of the EC common commercial policy is not the same
as the exclusivity of the EC’s implied powers under the ERTA principle. In this respect, Case
22/70 Commission v Council at paragraph 22 is an example. Paragraph 22 reads:
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If these two provisions are read in conjunction, it follows that to the
extent to which Community rules are promulgated for the attainment of the
objectives of the Treaty, the Member States cannot, outside the framework of
the Community institutions, assume obligations which might affect those
rules or alter their scope.142

Opinion 1/75 (Re OECD Local Costs Standard) shows that Member States no longer
have the right to adopt positions which differ from those which the EC intends to adopt in
relations with third countries, or take over actions which would hinder the EC in the exercise
of its tasks.143 Nor may they adopt internal legislation which undermines, or contradicts,
measures adopted, externally or internally, by the Community.
Another effect of exclusivity is that the EC must be allowed to exercise its powers
with total freedom. Ruling 1/78 (Re the Draft Convention on the Physical Protection of
Nuclear Materials, Facilities and Transports) in this respect concludes that “the Member
States, whether acting individually or collectively, are no longer able to impose on the EC
obligations which impose conditions on the exercise of prerogatives which thenceforth
belong to the EC and which therefore no longer fall within the field of national
sovereignty.”144 Therefore, the EC may have to become party to international agreements
which relate to areas of exclusive competence, in order to be in a position to comply with the
obligations in the agreements in question,145 and in order that the fulfillment of the tasks
given to the European Communities by the Treaties is not put in jeopardy.146 In addition to
that, as we can gather from the Joint Cases 3, 4 and 6/76 Cornelis Kramer, Member States
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are under a duty to use all the political and legal means at their disposal in order to ensure the
participation of the Community in such agreements.147

D.6.b.2.- Non-Exclusive Nature of EC Competence
As for non-exclusive Community competence, there are two types depending on the kind of
exercise of these competences. This exercise may be alternative or parallel (or
complementary) with the exercise of Member States’ competences. In the first case (when
the exercise of non-exclusive Community competence is alternative with the exercise of
Member States’ competences), if the Community exercises its non-exclusive competence,
Member States lose the possibility to exercise theirs.148 However, from the moment in which
the Community exercises its non-exclusive competence and to the extent where it will do so,
this exercise pushes away the possibility for Member States to act individually. The second
case (when the exercise of non-exclusive Community competence is parallel or
complementary with the exercise of Member States’ competences) appears in two occasions:

a) when the Community is competent to put into practice “action’s programmes” over
a Community policy which co-exists with national policies on the same field. The
typical example would be the one of research policies or cooperation policies to
development;

147
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b) when the Community produces a regulation which, by its own nature, can co-exist
with non-harmonized national rules. This is an exceptionally hypothetical case which
occurs in practice only in the field of intellectual property: the Community introduces
a title and/or a mechanism for protection of the additional intellectual property which
co-exists with the titles and/or mechanisms of the various Member States. Some
people may say that this hypothetical case shows an exclusive Community
competence (and not non-exclusive competence) since only the Community can
create a Community title of protection of intellectual property. This argument,
however, runs the risk of transforming all Community competences in exclusive
competences; since only the Community can act at a Community level, all
Community actions belong to the exclusive Community competence. It is, then,
preferable to reserve the term “exclusive” for cases where Community competence
excludes any possible national regime in the same field.

One should also observe that the analysis of Community competences must be
completed in relation to specific legal situations which are the subject of a potential
regulation. An international agreement can regulate different legal situations. Those
situations which do not belong to EC exclusive competence keep belonging to Member
States’ competences (unless the Community exercises its non-exclusive competence,
assuming that it exists in a specific issue).

D.6.c.- External and Internal EC Competences
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The distinction between external and internal competence is a problematic issue.149 During
the Community’s early years, there was a strong tendency to consider that the EC’s external
competence had a more limited scope than the internal competence. The evolution of the ECJ
case-law in its European Road Transport Agreement (ERTA) case [Case 22/70, Commission
v Council]150 and its Opinions 1/68 and 1/76151 consolidated the thesis of “parallelism”
between external and internal competences.152 McGoldrick explains this thesis: “[The
doctrine of parallelism] asserts that the competence of the EC to enter into international
agreements should run in “parallel” with the development of its internal competence –in
interno in foro externo.”153
With regard to the ERTA Case, I would like to write a few lines. The thesis of
parallelism previously mentioned gained approval in the ERTA Case.154 It was in 1962 when
five of the then six Member States of the EEC had signed an agreement known as the first
ERTA with certain other European States. Such an agreement was not ratified by enough of
the contracting States, which meant that the Member States began negotiations to conclude a
second ERTA. Meanwhile, the Council issued a regulation deriving from its internal power
covering the same areas. The Commission objected to the Council’s decision to allow
negotiations to continue and tried to annul the resolution to that effect in the ECJ. The second
149
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ERTA was nevertheless concluded in 1970. According to Kent, “the ECJ held that the EC
had the authority to enter into such an agreement. Authority may arise not only out of express
provision in the Treaty but also from other Treaty provisions and from secondary legislation.
When the EC had adopted common rules to implement a transport policy in 1960, Member
States lost their competence to conclude international agreements in this area.” 155
The European Court of Justice, in its Case C-327/91 France v Commission,156 deals
with parallel internal and external powers of the European Community. In the above case, the
Court gives the following view: “the ERTA judgment,157 as we know, is the frame of
reference for identifying the external powers of the Community, the Court having stated that
the possibility of concluding international agreements exists not only in the situations
exhaustively listed in the Treaty but also whenever the Community has internal powers.158”
The ECJ goes further by saying in this same judgment [Judgment in Case 22/70 Commission
v Council]159 that:

“with regard to the implementation of the provisions of the Treaty the
system of internal Community measures may not...be separated from that of
external relations. Clearly, if no account were taken to the fact that the point
at issue in that case was the division of powers between the Community and
the Member States, such a statement could be used for recognising, on the
assumption that the conditions are fulfilled, the Commission’s limited power
to conclude international agreements, which would thus constitute a
corollary, as it were, of its specific internal powers in a given area.”160
154
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Under this theory of parallelism (or implied powers), the treaty-making or external
competence of the EC should reflect its internal jurisdiction. The reasoning behind this
theory is that if the EC has the powers to legislate internally, it should also be competent to
enter into international agreements in the same fields. In this line of argument, one should
recall that the EC’s treaty-making powers may be divided into two categories: express
powers and implied powers. Agreements are negotiated by the Commission and concluded
by the Council, normally after consultation with the European Parliament.161
However, during the 70s, the Commission and an important part of the doctrine
developed the thesis by which the exclusive competence had a larger scope in the external
level than in the internal one. In other words, the Community would have an exclusive
competence to conclude international agreements on issues that, in the internal sphere, still
belong to Member States’ competences. This thesis has been invalidated by the Court of
Justice in its Opinions 1/94 and 2/94 which, grosso modo, follow the thesis of parallelism
between external and internal competences.
The so-called “open skies” agreement is evidence that, for a given distribution of
preferences, internal EC institutional mechanisms affect the outcomes of international trade
agreements.162 Since the U.S. is, and has been, the EC’s main trading and investment partner,
many trade negotiations have been successfully concluded between the two parties. This has
been the case “when their bargaining position easily converged or when trade-offs between
sectors were possible.”163 However, there are still many contested issues in EC-U.S. trade
161
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negotiations. One clear example is the field of aeronautics where, given the Member States’
preferences and depending on the negotiating context, the institutional mechanisms through
which Member States transferred their trade sovereignty affected the process and outcome of
the final international agreement.164
Open skies agreements eliminate restrictions on how often carriers can fly, the kind of
aircraft they can use, and the prices they can charge. The agreement covers both passenger
and cargo services, as well as scheduled and charter operations.165 The EC-U.S. dispute over
the “open skies” agreement illustrates of how third countries can get better outcomes when
EU Member States are free from the Commission in international trade negotiations, as
opposed to when the EU Member States negotiate with a single voice.
Regarding the deregulation of international aviation, the U.S. concluded various
bilateral agreements with several EU Member States. If the Commission had been the sole
negotiator for the entire EC, these agreements would not have been reached because three of
the big EU Member States (France, Germany, and the United Kingdom) initially opposed
this U.S.-led liberalization.166 In 1990, when the international aviation deregulation took
place, these three countries resisted U.S. attempts to open up the transatlantic skies because
of the large international stakes held by their national carriers. According to the Commission,
Article 133 EC gave it the exclusive authority to negotiate international air services with
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third parties. However, most EU Member States opposed the Commission’s proposal to take
over aviation negotiations.167
Since there was no supranational negotiating authority, the U.S. was able to enter into
bilateral agreements with Member States individually. Its strategy was to negotiate with “one
country at a time.”168 The smaller EU Member States became the focus of the EC-U.S. “open
skies” dispute. U.S. negotiators hoped that the success they had with bilateral agreements
with smaller EU Member States would be replicated with the big EU countries through
pressure to conclude similar deals.
Airlines in small EU Member States were interested in international liberalization.
They needed to compete in aggressively on world routes since they were not offering
domestic service. In December of 1992, the Netherlands and the U.S. signed the first of the
“open skies” agreements. The reaction of the Commission and the big EU Member States
was that this was an attempt by the U.S. government to “divide and conquer EC aviation.”169
In addition to that, the Commission also was concerned that the unilateral Dutch action
would undermine future negotiations should the supranational EC level ever take over.170
The Dutch-U.S. agreement made the Commission attempt to assert its negotiating
authority and competence in the field of international aviation in order to “prevent
discriminatory rights being gained by individual states at the cost of fellow members.”171
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When EU Member States hold veto power, it is not likely that an EU-led offensive
will actually materialize into a genuine negotiation with a third country because it takes only
one single Member State to cancel EC demands for change.

IV. The EC In International Trade Affairs During the Decades of the 80s and
90s172

A.- An Overview

Looking back to the 1950s, what is most surprising is the place the EC now holds in world
affairs. When the process of European integration started, the role of the EC in the
international arena was minimal. As time has gone by, it has developed a greater role in
international fora. There are a few important examples of EC action in the international arena
in 1997. In the trade sector, the EC played an important role in two significant WTO
agreements: the Telecommunications Service Agreement,173 which covers about 90% of
world revenues in the telecommunications sector and the Agreement on Financial Services,
which covers about 95% of trade in the banking, insurance, and security sectors.
In the same year, the EU donated Euros 438 million in humanitarian aid, and an EU
special envoy was sent to support the Middle East Peace Process. The EU has adopted a
strong position with regard to problematic states such as Cuba and Burma and led the
industrialized nations in their decision to reduce greenhouse emissions by the year 2010 at
172
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the Kyoto Summit on Climate Change174 in the Conference of the Parties to the Framework
Convention on Climate Change, Kyoto Protocol, in December 1997.175 Clearly, the EU has
developed into a significant actor in many international spheres.
That said, it is important to note that more than just traditional external policies will
define the EU’s role. As the EC has integrated to create a single European Market with a
single currency, its domestic policies are increasingly influencing its role in the international
arena.176 Since 1958, the vision of the EEC Founders has been expanding geographically as
the EU has grown from six members to the current 25. With the Single European Act177 and
the completion of the single market, economic integration has created a cohesive entity.
Already in 1973, with the first enlargement of the EC to nine Member States, the EC had
become the world’s largest trading bloc.
The 12-member EC of 1986 was already the largest trading power in the world.
However, the EC, just like the U.S., showed some significant internal weaknesses to the
outside world: although the European Commission has the power to initiate and execute
decisions for its Member States in international trade negotiations, its proposals must, by law,
first be approved by the EU Council. Some authors argue that this internal division is
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detrimental for the EC’s role as leader in the international trading system.178 Toward the end
of the Uruguay Round (early 90s), the U.S. leadership was being weakened. President
Clinton utilized U.S. protectionist pressures which slowed the moves toward a Uruguay
Round agreement. By contrast, Leon Brittan, EU trade commissioner at the time, adopted a
more assertive role. This made the leadership between the U.S. and the EC in the framework
of the Uruguay Round more balanced.
In the late 1990s, the EC devoted important efforts to encouraging other countries to
launch a comprehensive WTO round. One of the reasons for the EC to favor a more
comprehensive and broader agenda was that it believed there would be more opportunities
for cross-cutting agreements among sectors. It would also facilitate progress in the
negotiations themselves. However, the EC had neither the economic power nor the unity of
purpose to replace the U.S. as a leader in the world trading system. Thus, a degree of
consensus was necessary between the U.S. and the EC if a new WTO round was to be
possible. The U.S. and the EC have both become highly dependent on trade and they both
had a shared interest in launching the new WTO round at Doha.179

B.- Marrakesh: Opinion 1/94 and its Consequences between 1994 and now
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Already during the negotiations to the Maastricht Treaty,180 the Commission had envisaged
the replacement of the common commercial policy with a common external economic policy,
whose scope would be larger, including not only trade in services, commercial aspects of
intellectual property, and goods but also the external dimension of competition,
establishment, and investment.181 The decision to include aspects of external economic
policy within the scope of Article 133 EC thanks to the Nice amendment to that Article was
based “on the desirability of specific procedures, reinforcing the ‘open’ nature of the
CCP.”182
In April 1994, the WTO Agreement was signed in Marrakesh. As a consequence of
such agreement, Opinion 1/94 of the ECJ saw the light a few months later. The Court had to
examine the question of whether the EC has the exclusive competence to conclude the WTO
Agreement, including the GATT,183 the GATS,184 the TRIPS Agreement,185 and the dispute
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settlement understanding (DSU).186 The answer to this question depended on the scope of
Article 133 EC. The European Commission’s position at the hearing was that shared

Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, April 15, 1994,
“Legal Instruments –Results of the Uruguay Round,” 1 (1994), 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994). The GATS is one of the
Agreements implemented by the WTO. The GATS sets rules for who controls or owns services and limits
government regulation in the services sector. The GATS covers all services including health care, education and
utilities such as water, data management, energy, banking, transportation, and insurance. Some commentators –
especially Lori Wallach- argue that only a small part of the GATS is about trade. The GATS is often called a
“backdoor Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI),” because it creates rights for foreign investors to set
up service business inside other WTO countries. The GATS allows some flexibility for countries to determine
which service sectors they want to subject to the GATS full participation and deregulation pressures. However,
some GATS rules apply even to sectors where countries have not committed. In addition, the text of the GATS
commits all WTO countries to “progressive liberalization” (Article XIX.1 of the GATS). Expansion of the
GATS scope and the sectors it covers is now underway in the so-called “GATS 2000” negotiations. Currently,
the GATS 2000 negotiations are in the “request/offer” phase, where WTO members engage in bilateral
negotiations requesting that other countries open up service sectors and offering sectors that they themselves
will put on the negotiating table. For example, the EC has requested that WTO countries liberalize their water
service, and the U.S. has requested that Brazil open for ownership by U.S. corporations elements of public
higher education services. Once a sector is committed to the GATS, it is virtually impossible for the public to
reinstall control over it because the GATS rules require financial compensation to every WTO member to do so.
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competence would bring a series of problems in relation to the administration of these trade
agreements, and that the EC had exclusive competence in the areas covered by these
agreements. However, the EU Council indicated that these are areas of shared competence
between the EC and its Member States and thus one could have a mixed agreement.187
In Opinion 1/94, the ECJ rejected the Commission’s argument that all trade in
services and intellectual property rights were included in the EC’s common commercial
policy insofar as they were covered by the TRIPS Agreement.188 That said, the ECJ also
refused the exclusion of trade in services from the common commercial policy as a matter of
principle: “it follows from the open nature of the common commercial policy, within the
meaning of the Treaty, that trade in services cannot immediately, and as a matter of principle,
be excluded from the scope of Article 113.”189
The ECJ’s response was that the EC did not enjoy exclusive competence for the
conclusion of the WTO Agreement. In trade in goods, the ECJ did accept the EC’s exclusive
competence on the basis of Article 133 EC.190 With regard to trade in services and traderelated aspects of intellectual property rights, the Court decided that the EC is only partially
competent for theses matters.191 With regard to exclusive external EC competence on these
areas, it was also denied by the ECJ on the grounds that the EC had neither completely
harmonized all services sectors nor all matters covered by the TRIPS Agreement.192 The
Court also considered whether an exclusive external EC competence for areas covered by the
187
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GATS and the TRIPS Agreement could be implied from the necessity to conclude the WTO
Agreement as a means to achieve the goals of the EC Treaty, or from Article 95 EC193 or
Article 308 EC. The Court, however, denied such an interpretation.194

192
193

Id. at paras. 96-97 and 102 et seq.
Article 95 EC reads:

1. By way of derogation from Article 94 and save where otherwise provided in this Treaty, the following
provisions shall apply for the achievement of the objectives set out in Article 14. The Council shall, acting in
accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 251 and after consulting the Economic and Social
Committee, adopt the measures for the approximation of the provisions laid down by law, regulation or
administrative action in Member States which have as their object the establishment and functioning of the
internal market.
2. Paragraph 1 shall not apply to fiscal provisions, to those relating to the free movement of persons nor to
those relating to the rights and interests of employed persons.
3. The Commission, in its proposals envisaged in paragraph 1 concerning health, safety, environmental
protection and consumer protection, will take as a base a high level of protection, taking account in particular of
any new development based on scientific facts. Within their respective powers, the European Parliament and the
Council will also seek to achieve this objective.
4. If, after the adoption by the Council or by the Commission of a harmonisation measure, a Member State
deems it necessary to maintain national provisions on grounds of major needs referred to in Article 30, or
relating to the protection of the environment or the working environment, it shall notify the Commission of
these provisions as well as the grounds for maintaining them.
5. Moreover, without prejudice to paragraph 4, if, after the adoption by the Council or by the Commission of a
harmonisation measure, a Member State deems it necessary to introduce national provisions based on new
scientific evidence relating to the protection of the environment or the working environment on grounds of a
problem specific to that Member State arising after the adoption of the harmonisation measure, it shall notify
the Commission of the envisaged provisions as well as the grounds for introducing them.
6. The Commission shall, within six months of the notifications as referred to in paragraphs 4 and 5, approve
or reject the national provisions involved after having verified whether or not they are a means of arbitrary
discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade between Member States and whether or not they shall
constitute an obstacle to the functioning of the internal market.
In the absence of a decision by the Commission within this period the national provisions referred to in
paragraphs 4 and 5 shall be deemed to have been approved.
When justified by the complexity of the matter and in the absence of danger for human health, the Commission
may notify the Member State concerned that the period referred to in this paragraph may be extended for a
further period of up to six months.
7. When, pursuant to paragraph 6, a Member State is authorised to maintain or introduce national provisions
derogating from a harmonisation measure, the Commission shall immediately examine whether to propose an
adaptation to that measure.
8. When a Member State raises a specific problem on public health in a field which has been the subject of
prior harmonisation measures, it shall bring it to the attention of the Commission which shall immediately
examine whether to propose appropriate measures to the Council.
9. By way of derogation from the procedure laid down in Articles 226 and 227, the Commission and any
Member State may bring the matter directly before the Court of Justice if it considers that another Member State
is making improper use of the powers provided for in this Article.
10. The harmonisation measures referred to above shall, in appropriate cases, include a safeguard clause
authorising the Member States to take, for one or more of the non-economic reasons referred to in Article 30,
provisional measures subject to a Community control procedure.
194
Id. at paras. 73 et seq., 99 et seq.
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The unique nature of the EC in the WTO (the European Communities, along with the
EU Member States, are members of the WTO) has some policy and procedural implications.
In my opinion, the ECJ is responsible for the fiasco on the interpretation of the WTO
Agreement, reflected in Opinion 1/94 (WTO Agreement) for the allocation of powers
between the EC and its Member States in trade matters. In this case, the Commission had
requested the ECJ to confirm the exclusive EC competence to sign all the agreements which
are part of the WTO Agreement.195 The Commission raised the issue of potential problems
regarding the administration of the various agreements that were part of the WTO package, if
the Community and the Member States were to share competence to participate in the
conclusion of the GATS and TRIPS Agreement.196 According to the Commission, the
Community’s unity of action vis-à-vis the rest of the world would be undermined and its
negotiating power greatly weakened if the Member States were allowed to express their own
views in the WTO, or if the Community position had to always be adopted by consensus.197
According to the Commission, the Community should have sole responsibility for the
conclusion of the agreement.
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The Court responded to the Commission’s concern by saying:

first, that any problems which may arise in implementation of the WTO
Agreement and its annexes as regards the co-ordination necessary to ensure
unity of action where the Community and the Member States participate
jointly cannot modify the answer to the question of competence, that being a
prior issue...
(108) Next, where it is apparent that the subject matter of an
agreement or convention falls in part within the competence of the
Community and in part within that of the Member States, it is essential to
ensure close cooperation between the Member States and the Community
institutions, both in the process of negotiation and conclusion and in the
fulfillment of the commitments entered into. That obligation flows from the
requirement of unity in the international representation of the Community...
(109) The duty to co-operate is all the more imperative in the case of
agreements such as those annexed to the WTO Agreement, which are
inextricably interlinked, and in view of the cross retaliation measures
established by the Dispute Settlement Understanding.198

From this Opinion,199 one can infer that the primacy of the Commission as negotiator
of trade agreements was undercut somewhat by the Court of Justice when it ruled in 1994
that certain aspects of matters dealt with by the WTO -involving services trade and
intellectual property- did not fall within the scope of the common commercial policy. The
Nice Treaty further developed this issue so that today the common commercial policy
includes trade in goods, intellectual property rights and services, except health, education,
and audiovisual services, which are shared with the EU Member States.200 Since the notion of
European identity has not yet coalesced to the point that it is possible to speak of a common
good for the entire EU, perhaps for this reason the European Court of Justice, in its Opinion
1/94 upon the WTO, emphasizes the duty of cooperation between the Member States and the
Community institutions. It is, nevertheless, important to distinguish between what the law
198
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requires and what the policy adopted by the EU institutions and Member States may be in a
particular case.201

B.1.- Consequences of Opinion 1/94

B.1.a- The EC and its Member States Have Competence

The European Court of Justice has its own view with regard to agreements where some of
their provisions fall under EC competence, and others remain under the competence of the
Member States. Unfortunately, although the Court deals with the issue throughout its caselaw, it does not say how to solve the problem. The view of a national Court (the French
Conseil Constitutionnel) on this matter shall be analyzed later to help us understand how this
issue is resolved in practice.
In Opinion 1/94,202 the European Commission argued that the EC had exclusive
competence in all matters covered by the agreement giving effect to the Uruguay Round. In
Opinion 2/92203 on OECD National Treatment Instrument, the European Commission also
argued that the EC had exclusive competence with regard to trade in services. The European
Commission was therefore arguing that the EC had exclusive competence with respect to the
whole field of external trade relations.
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The ECJ rejected this statement. In the case of Opinion 1/94, the ECJ held that the EC
and its Member States were jointly competent to conclude the General Agreement on Trade
in Services (GATS) and the Agreement on Trade related Aspects of Intellectual Property
(TRIPS). With respect to Opinion 2/92, the ECJ held that the EC and its Member States were
jointly competent to enter into the instrument in question.204 When asked to clarify the
allocation of competence within the Union to conclude the Uruguay Round Agreements, the
European Court of Justice confirmed in November 1994 the Community's exclusive
competence with respect to the conclusion of multilateral agreements relating to goods.
However, competence to conclude agreements related to certain types of services and
intellectual property was shared between the Community and the Member States.
Consequently, the WTO Agreements were signed by the Council, Commission and the
Member States and ratified by the Council, with the European Parliament's approval, as well
as by national parliaments.
In practical terms, this means according to the ECJ that the EC and its Member States
can be jointly competent with regard to international agreements.205 For Member States, this
is an important ‘victory’ since their competence is given full recognition for the
implementation of the international agreements in question. Along the same line, where the
agreements are being negotiated, the Member States’ competence and rights which flow from
it are entitled to recognition.206 Since in both Opinion 1/94 and 2/92 the ECJ clarified the
division of competence between the EU institutions and the Member States in areas of
203
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services, establishment and intellectual property. Therefore, this means that in practice the
duty of cooperation will assume great importance.
More recently, we see how Article I-13 (2) of the Constitutional Treaty reflects the caselaw of the ECJ on the Union’s exclusive competence to conclude international agreements.
The Community’s competence to conclude international agreements arises from two sources:
1. express provisions in the Treaty. For example, Article 133 EC enables the EC to enter
into tariff and trade agreements within the scope of the common commercial policy;
and
2. The jurisprudence of the ECJ.207 The Court has held that external competence may
flow from other provisions of the Treaty and measures adopted within the framework
of those provisions.

The existence of internal rules208 or unexercised Treaty

powers209 to adopt such rules confers external competences to the Community.

As a matter of law, the Community’s ability to conduct external relations is restricted to
those areas where it has competence, whether it is exclusive or shared. On the other hand,
where and to the extent that the Community has competence, Member States’ freedom of
action is limited. A consequence of the supremacy of EC law is that Member States cannot
prejudice the operation of Community law by entering into external obligations. Thus,
Member States may not enter into agreements between themselves or with third States on the
same subject matter. The EC and its Member States share competence in a situation in which
the transfer of competence is partial, because the Treaty expressly preserves Member States’
206
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competence210 or because the internal rules do not occupy the whole field. Both will be
parties to the international agreement, which is commonly known as a mixed agreement.
As Dashwood suggests,211 critics of the ECJ’s Opinion 1/94 have seen that crossretaliation (for example, imposition of trade restrictions as a sanction for the failure by a third
country adequately to protect intellectual property rights) may not be a possible option for the
EC and its Member States, where different elements of a strategy fall under different
competencies.212 According to Dashwood, the problems of legal mixity are not unsolvable or
uncontrollable.213 As we will see later in this article, zealous efforts were made during the
Nice Summit to secure an amendment to Article 133 of the Amsterdam Treaty that would
change the consequences of Opinion 1/94 with regard to action within the WTO. The
outcome was not very radical: Article 133 (5) EC empowered the EU Council to change the
existing law.
According to Weiler, Member States are not prepared to live in a world in which the
Community assumes that it is competent in all fields of trade. Proof competence is necessary
from now on. Opinion 1/94 is a good example.214 The Commission had requested the ECJ
under the procedure of Article 300 (6) EC to confirm the exclusive competence of the EC to
conclude the WTO Agreement (the GATT, the GATS, and the TRIPS Agreement) which had
been negotiated within the framework of the Uruguay Round.215 The Council, however,
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hoped that the Court would establish a clear dividing line between the Community’s and the
Member States’ competence with respect to trade liberalization for purposes of ratification
and future negotiations. The outcome was a shock to many: the Commission’s powers in the
field of services and intellectual property rights were severely curtailed. The ECJ concluded
that the GATS and the TRIPS Agreement had to be concluded as a mixed agreement. Had
the ECJ’s interpretation of the ERTA doctrine been more expansive, it would have supported
a more pro-Community view. In the post-Opinion 1/94 period, Member States have worked
more closely together in international trade issues.216 There are signs that the Commission is
more cautious now. A new code of conduct has evolved in this field, regulating the
interaction between the Commission and EU Member States.217
It is important to mention the distinction made by the ECJ between the modes to
supply services, on the one hand, and the trade-related intellectual property rights, on the
other. As for the modes to supply services, they do not concern the nature of the services
rendered, but rather the way in which the services concerned are provided. By contrast, traderelated intellectual property rights concern the nature of these rights.218

B.1.b.- Doctrine Of The French Conseil Constitutionnel
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Ruling Number 37-394 DC, of December 31, 1997, of the French Conseil Constitutionnel on
the required Constitutional revisions for ratification of the Treaty of Amsterdam,219 illustrates
some of the problems mentioned above. On one hand, the ruling corrects Article 88-1 of the
French Constitution from the constitutional Act of June 25, 1992, on the division of
competences between the Community and the Member States. By that provision, the
Community will only be a simple mechanism to “exercise in common” certain Member
States’ competences, and the French Conseil Constitutionnel refers consistently to the
“transfer of competences” from the French State to the Community.220 On the other hand, the
Conseil Constitutionnel continues to develop the thesis by which “the necessary conditions to
exercise national sovereignty” are not affected by the transfer of competences itself but by
the types of exercise of these competences. This would be affected if the Council adopted
decisions by qualified majority but not if unanimity was used. The above thesis had already
been introduced by the Conseil Constitutionnel in its previous Ruling on the Treaty of
Maastricht.
There are three problems with this thesis. First of all, Ruling Number 37-394 DC of
December 31, 1997 of the French Conseil Constitutionnel is relevant to the external
economic relations of the EC because it states that the Community is a mechanism used to
obtain a common position between the EC and its Member States in certain domains. The
ruling states that there will be a transfer of competences from the national to the Community
level. Secondly, in its Opinion 1/94 on the division of competences between the Community
and the Member States regarding the agreements from the negotiations in the Uruguay
219
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Round, had the European Court of Justice taken a position stating that the exclusive EC
competence covered the integrity of the agreements, the consequence for the French State
would have been that it would not have had competences on trade matters. Therefore, it
would not have been able to become a member of the World Trade Organization, which was
clearly not intended and would not have been agreed to by France.
Finally, the “constitutional” problem is that of the existence, the nature (whether
exclusive or non-exclusive) and the limits of EC competences and not of the exercise of EC
competences. The exercise of EC competences is primarily a political problem, in which
juridical-constitutional apriorisms are often bad advisors. As Professor Torrent points out, the
requirement of unanimity in the Council is seen by some as a guarantee of the ability to block
the action of a majority that is against the interest of the French government.221 However, the
example could be reversed: unanimity allows the representative of a government of any other
Member State to block the action of a majority where the French government participates.
In the case of EC exclusive competences, blocking Community action cannot be
compensated for by an action at the national level. In such a case, preference for unanimity or
qualified majority depends on seeing if in the near future it will be more beneficial to “block
others” (by choosing inaction) or to run the risk of “being blocked by others” (and being
condemned to inaction).222 This is a question of a political nature and not a juridicalconstitutional question.

B.2.- Trade in Services
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With regard to trade in services, the distinction made by the ECJ between modes to supply
services and services as such had an immediate consequence: competencies between the EC
and its Member States were divided since trade in services is not restricted to a specific mode
to supply services, in other words, cross-border supply of services.223 As an example, we
have the ECJ’s judgment on the legal base of the agreement on government procurement
between the EC and the U.S. before the entry into force of the plurilateral WTO Government
Procurement Agreement.224 Here, the ECJ declared void the Council’s decision by which the
bilateral agreement between the EC and the U.S. had been approved. Article 133 EC was
considered not to be a sufficient legal base for this decision.225
The ECJ interpreted that the EC has both explicit and implied foreign trade
competencies. The WTO Agreement was jointly ratified by the EC and its Member States.226
This means that the WTO Agreement is a mixed agreement and, therefore, there is a need for
constant cooperation between the EC and its Member States in areas where there is no
exclusive EC competence. The ECJ’s Opinion 1/94 on the division of competencies between
the EC and its Member States in the area of external trade relations meant that the legal
phenomenon of “mixed agreements” had to be relied upon more often, given that new free
trade agreements include trade in services and intellectual property rights due to their
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increased economic significance, for example, the mixed agreement between Mexico and the
EC on economic partnership,227 political coordination, and cooperation.228 Another witness
of this legal phenomenon is the mixed agreement between the EC and its Member States and
South Africa. This agreement’s conclusion was blocked by some Member States on the
grounds that the South African concessions in the area of geographic indications for
alcoholic beverages such as Grappa, Ouzo and Port were insufficient.229

B.3.- Intellectual Property Rights

With respect to intellectual property rights, according to the ECJ, the primary objective of the
TRIPS Agreement is “to strengthen and harmonise the protection of intellectual property on a
worldwide scale.”230 Therefore, those who were hoping to bring into the single procedure of
Article 133 EC the whole range of matters that appear in the WTO package where the EC is
competent are likely to be disappointed.
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The exclusive EC competence in trade matters did not extend to certain aspects of the
international supply of services,231 or to the harmonization of rules on the protection of
intellectual property rights,232 which the Court identified as the primary objective of the
TRIPS Agreement.233 Two issues can be analysed from the construction given to Article 133
EC in Opinion 1/94: first, there were large parts of the WTO Agreement where EC
competence fell to be exercised on the basis of provisions other than Article 133 EC,
including Article 308 EC. This last Article requires the Council to act by unanimity,
strengthening thereby the hand of the EC negotiators to resist demands for policy changes;
second, EU Member States were free to conclude the relevant parts of the WTO package
through the collective exercise of national powers, rather than through the EC.234 In this
sense, in Case C-53/96 Hermes International v. FHT Marketing Choice BV, the Court said
that “the WTO Agreement was concluded by the Community and ratified by its Member
States without any allocation between them of their respective obligations towards the other
contracting parties.”235

B.4.- Duty of Cooperation

Once again, the ECJ, in the final part of its (in)famous Opinion 1/94,236 opted for the duty of
cooperation as the panacea in cases of division of powers between the EC and its Member
States. The duty of co-operation seems to be a rather broad formula for the achievement of a
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unitary character for the EC. An example is the Community’s post-Opinion 1/94 external
relations regime. Opinion 1/94 does not give any guidelines as to the more specific
implementation of the “duty of cooperation”.237 Co-operation has taken place until now
either ad hoc or under an informal “code of conduct” agreed in May 1994 between the
Council, the Commission and the Member States at the “post-Uruguay Round” negotiations
on services.238 However, the Member States, the Council and the Commission have been
unable to reach an agreement –in spite of numerous attempts- upon a permanent and more
comprehensive code that would cover the Community and Member States’ participation in
the WTO as a whole.
Nor does Opinion 1/94 indicate any provisions of either the EC Treaty or the Treaty
on European Union in which the duty of co-operation can be found.239 To justify its position,
the Court simply referred to its previous case-law (Ruling 1/78 on the Draft Convention of
the International Atomic Energy Agency on Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials,
Facilities and Transport, paragraphs 34-36 240 and Opinion 2/91 on ILO Convention 170 on
Chemicals at Work, paragraph 36241).242
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Where competence is shared between the EC and its Member States, both Member
States and the EC are obliged to seek a common position. Coordination of their positions is
indispensable to prevent inconsistencies or even mutual blockage within the framework of an
international organization.243 According to the ECJ, this requirement of unity in the
international representation of the three Communities shows the importance of co-operation
or close association between the Member States and the EC institutions in the negotiation or
conclusion of agreements and in the fulfillment of commitments at the international level.244
Community and Member States, since they have an obligation to co-operate, must attempt to
organize harmoniously their coexistence in international organizations in which they share
membership and competence, such as the WTO,245 as was already stated in Opinion 2/91.246
As for the fulfillment of commitments at the international level, Opinion 1/94 (Re
WTO Agreement)247 describes how Community and Member States are each other’s
prisoners. The one cannot act without the other. Achieving a common position of Member
States is a sine qua non for Community action. As a consequence of Opinion 1/94 of the
ECJ,248 there was a need for a uniform international representation of the EC.249 In spite of
this, the EU Member States tried to pursue more strongly their interests in the area of
external trade. One example is the use of voting rights within the Food and Agriculture
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Organization (FAO).250 Here, the ECJ ruled that the Member States did not respect their duty
of cooperation with the EC.251

C.- The Amsterdam Treaty252

The 1997 Amsterdam Treaty provided for a possible future decision by the Council to extend
the common commercial policy to new areas: “The Council, acting unanimously on a
proposal from the Commission and after consulting the European Parliament, may extend the
application of paragraphs 1 to 4 to international negotiations and agreements on services and
intellectual property insofar as they are not covered by these paragraphs.”253 In this sense, the
Commission saw the Treaty of Amsterdam as giving an answer to the fundamental question
of competence:
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“Questions relating to trade in goods, but only parts of
investment, services and intellectual property are already
included in the day-to-day EU trade activity. Since the Treaty of
Amsterdam, the rest is in an intermediate position: essentially an
EU competence, but only to be used when the Council decides so
by unanimity.”254

Paragraph 5 was added to Article 133 EC by the Treaty of Amsterdam as a result of
Opinion 1/94 of the ECJ,255 which held that the EC and its Member States were jointly
competent to participate in the WTO agreement. This clause has not been used thus far.
“Amsterdam did not succeed in transferring enough policy areas from unanimity to
qualified-majority voting to free up the decision-making process looking ahead to a Union of
28 Member States.”256 In fact, some commentators speak of unanimity as a dictatorship in
EU policy-making, given the heterogeneity of the Member States’ legal systems.257 Thus, the
EC continues to face some difficulties in creating a coherent commercial policy. The
Amsterdam intergovernmental conference negotiations did not extend the scope of EC
powers in the field of external trade policy. However, they laid the foundations for a broader
scope of EC powers in this field.258 Although the Treaty of Amsterdam included some
amendments stating that Article 133 EC procedures could have extended over intellectual
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property and services, it still represents a hurdle because most decisions relating to these
sectors must be unanimous,259 in reference to the use of Article 133 (5) EC.
However, not all agreements on intellectual property and services would have to be
concluded by unanimous vote, since there are aspects of services and intellectual property
which already fall within the scope of the EC’s common commercial policy. In addition,
even with the provisions of the Amsterdam Treaty enabling the Commission to act as
spokesperson in this type of negotiation,260 it would have been more difficult to reach a
Community position if Member States had been forced to reach unanimity.
As a result of shared competence between the EC and its Member States in intellectual
property rights, some WTO members have introduced cases related to services and
intellectual property rights against individual Member States instead of against the EC as a
whole. For instance, the United States has brought various cases under the TRIPS
Agreement261 against Denmark, Sweden, and Ireland. In the last case, the U.S. brought a case
against Ireland regarding measures affecting the grant of copyrights and neighboring
rights.262 The Commission’s main argument in the discussion on expanding EC competence
over intellectual property and services was based on the EC’s need to be effective in
international negotiations. However, Member States were not readily convinced, perhaps
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because the success of the Uruguay Round revealed concerns on the balance between the
respective roles of the EC and its Member States in international affairs.263
The Amsterdam Treaty thus offered the possibility to modify the EC Treaty
autonomously.264 In other words, the EC Treaty could be modified independently of an
intergovernmental conference (IGC) and ratification procedures in the Member States.265
Such modification might have ended the so-called “division of powers between the EC and
its Member States” in areas of trade in services and intellectual property rights stipulated by
the ECJ in its Opinion 1/94, and therefore might have led to an exclusive EC competence.266
This means that the negotiations and conclusions of international trade agreements in these
issues would not have required a unanimous decision by the Council anymore and there
would not have been need to ratify the agreement in question by all the EU Member States.
Thus, the often-criticized interpretation of Article 133 EC by the ECJ in its Opinion 1/94
would have been corrected.267
It is important to be clear on the limits imposed by the drafting of Article 133 (5) of
the Treaty of Amsterdam on the EC competence that may be created by the Council. Firstly,
Article 133 (5) of the Treaty of Amsterdam made reference to “international negotiations and
agreements.” This gave the new competence only an external application, unlike the general
competence of the EC under Article 133 EC, which is exercisable both internally and
263
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externally. Secondly, the Council had not been authorized to create a general competence for
the EC to conclude international agreements on services and intellectual property matters.
The type of agreements in question were those designed to remove impediments to the
supply of services by non-nationals or to ensure the protection of intellectual property rights
that belong to non-nationals.
However, one cannot imagine a situation where a legal basis derived from Article 133
EC was used for concluding an agreement having as its essential objective the harmonization
of important areas of the parties’ internal legislation.268 In this sense, as the ECJ explained in
its Opinion 1/94, the EC Institutions may not, by concluding an agreement under Article 133
EC, “escape the internal constraints to which they are subject in relation to procedures and to
rules as to voting.”269

V. The End Of A Millenium: The Nice Treaty270

It is interesting to contrast the Amsterdam IGC negotiations with the Nice IGC
negotiations.271 At Amsterdam, little attention was given to trade policy. In relation to
whether it should have been the European Commission or the EU Member States to lead

Tridimas, “The WTO and OECD Opinions” in Dashwood and Hillion (eds.) THE GENERAL LAW OF EC
EXTERNAL RELATIONS (2000), p. 48 et seq.
268
A. Dashwood, “E.C. External Relations Provision Post-Amsterdam” in A. Dashwood & C. Hillion (eds.)
THE GENERAL LAW OF EC EXTERNAL RELATIONS, 2000, p. 281.
269
1994 E.C.R. I-5267, para.60.
270
A deep legal analysis of the common commercial policy according to the Nice Treaty can be found in
Neframi, E. “La Politique Commerciale Commune selon le Traite de Nice,” Cahiers de Droit Europeen, Nos. 56, 2001, pp. 605-646.
271
Meunier, S. & Nicolaidis, K. “Who Speaks for Europe? The Delegation of Trade Authority in the European
Union,” Journal of Common Market Studies, 37(3): 477-501, 1999; Nicolaidis, K. & Meunier, S. “Revisiting
Trade Competence in the European Union: Amsterdam, Nice and Beyond,” in Hosli, M. & van Deemen, A.
(eds.) Institutional Challenges in the European Union, New York, Routledge, 2002.

68

Rafael Leal-Arcas

services trade negotiations, this debate took place in complete public indifference. However,
various civil society organizations mobilized in an intelligent manner before the Nice summit
on the same unresolved issue of services trade negotiations, with the difference that this time
they publicized their actions in the media, especially in a document entitled “Red Alert on the
‘133’.”272
As noted earlier, the EC does not have exclusive competence in the areas of services,
intellectual property rights, and investment273 in international trade negotiations. Is it because
the Founding Fathers thought that Europe would be better off by having exclusive
competence only in the area of goods, leaving aside the other areas? Let us remember that
when the Treaty of Rome was created in 1957, it was for a group of six relatively
homogeneous countries in economic terms.274 The post-World War II European leaders’
dream was to have an economically and politically unified Europe. However, authors such as
Robert M. Dunn argue that “the arrival of the euro as the standard currency [...] does not
guarantee the union’s success.”275
In any given international negotiation, the European Commission can negotiate on
behalf of the Member States under two types of legal framework: exclusive and mixed
competence. Under mixed competence, Member States retain a veto power through
ratification by their national parliaments and through unanimity voting in the EU Council. In
the case of exclusive competence, only a qualified majority vote in the EU Council is
theoretically necessary for ratification. Therefore, it seems that with exclusive competence
272
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the EC speaks with one voice (being that of the Commission), whereas with mixed
competence there is cacophony.276 In practice, the existence of exclusive competence does
not guarantee a single voice since some Member States still exercise a veto during trade
negotiations.
A sensu contrario, Member States have been able to speak with a single voice in areas
of mixed competence. In any event, even if the principle of unity of representation by the
Commission is often pursued, Member States seek to reduce the Commission’s autonomy,
but in areas of exclusive competence the role of the Commission is nevertheless enhanced
since Member States do not have a say. Furthermore, there is no frozen EC common position
when the EC’s interlocutor is a strong party such as the U.S., Japan or Canada. In other
words, there are constant changes in the Member States’ positions. That is to say, when
negotiations are dynamic, it is more difficult to have an EC single voice.
The most recent amendments to the EC policy-making system show that indirectly
there is a tendency towards exclusive EC competence with time:
1. Before Nice, the so-called “shared competence” issues were ruled under a unanimity
system of voting in the EU Council. After Nice, the system has become more flexible
towards EC policy convergence. With time, one might think that the future of EC
policies might well be exclusive EC competence;
2. At the Intergovernmental Conference of December 2000 in Nice, it was decided that
trade agreements relating to services or commercial aspects of intellectual property
can, in principle, be concluded by the Council acting by qualified majority. Although
275
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there are exceptions to this principle,277 this has decided to put an end to most "mixed
agreements" and to open decision-making to qualified-majority voting, leaving aside
the old system of unanimity.278 “Among the exceptions to this principle, based on the
need for parallel internal and external rules, it should be noted that the Council cannot
conclude agreements harmonizing national legislation in the fields of culture,
education or human health where the Community does not have internal powers to
harmonize. Moreover, the Treaty provides that the Council must act unanimously
where the agreement contains provisions requiring unanimity to adopt internal rules
or where the agreement relates to an area where the Community has not yet exercised
its powers at the internal level. The Treaty also maintains transport as a separate
sector.”279

A.- History of the Nice Negotiations

When the GATT was created in 1947, the main engine of world trade was goods. Services
hardly played a role in the international trading system. As trade in services became more
relevant, there was a debate inside the EC on whether or not trade in services fell within the
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common commercial policy of the EC (Article 133 EC). For three main reasons was this
debate important:
1. the unitary character of EC trade policy among the EU Member States;280
2. the exclusivity of EC competence in the common commercial policy;281 and
3. the decision-making implications of Article 133 EC. This Article gives responsibility
for international negotiations to the Commission, it does not require consultation of
the European Parliament, and decisions are adopted in the EU Council by qualifiedmajority vote.

It might be surprising to see that the Nice Summit agenda included the topic of
external trade policy. Why was it the case? Mainly because the EU Council had not taken a
decision in accordance with Article 133 (5) of the Amsterdam Treaty to extend the scope of
the EC’s common commercial policy.282 Therefore, it seemed appropriate to include the EC’s
common commercial policy in the Nice IGC, which had as one of its aims the extension of
qualified-majority voting to politically sensitive areas of the EC Treaty. The case-law on the
dynamic nature of the common commercial policy and interpretation of Article 133 EC283
supported the extension of the EC’s common commercial policy into services.284 However,
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this dynamic nature of the EC’s common commercial policy is kept within the control of the
EU Council and is limited to intellectual property.285
Article 133 (5) of the Amsterdam Treaty left a series of questions unanswered, one of
which was the extent of the EC’s existing external competence in relation to services, based
on implied as opposed to express powers.286 Since there was a need to find adequate and
efficient negotiating mechanisms in the framework of the WTO, a reform of Article 133 EC
was imminent at Nice. As we will see below, part of the discussion was about the extension
of qualified-majority voting within the EU. In the words of the Commission at the time,
“trade issues at this [Nice] IGC essentially concern the replacement of the unanimity rule by
qualified majority.”287
Jean-Claude Piris, Director-General of the Council Legal Service, published a note in
May 2000 on EC external economic relations.288 Four main issues were at stake:
1. EC participation in the WTO;
2. EC single position in relation to third countries and the best decision-making process
to achieve this goal;
3. the conclusion of mixed agreements; and
4. the establishment of the EC’s position within a joint body set up under an agreement,
when that joint body is to adopt decisions with legal effects.
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With regard to the first issue, Piris proposed two options: 1) the revision of Article
133 (5) EC in order to require only a qualified-majority vote, as opposed to unanimity, so
that trade in services and intellectual property could be included into the common
commercial policy of the EC; 2) the creation of a Protocol on participation in the WTO. The
advantage of such a Protocol for the EU’s decision-making process would be the existence of
qualified-majority voting, even in the field of Member States competence. The Protocol
option was rejected by Mr Lamy, ex-EU trade commissioner.
Since the situation at the time only worked where there is consensus, failure to reach
it would lead to a deadlock and to the impossibility to comply with the duty of cooperation
expressed by the ECJ.289 With the imminent phenomenon of enlargement, paralysis would
seem even more credible in the EU decision-making process based on unanimity, given the
greater diversity of national interests and views. Thus, the need for reformation of the current
situation was clear. In Piris’s words, there was a need for “clear, simple, transparent,
effective legal rules enabling a common position to be established by a qualified majority in
all cases.” Already the draft Protocol proposed common positions to be adopted by the
Council, acting by qualified-majority vote; the Commission would be the “spokesman and
sole negotiator” for the EC and its Member States in the WTO framework, presenting the
common position agreed in the Council. Therefore, as Cremona rightly argues, “the
complexity of the Nice amendment is a reminder of just how difficult it is to achieve
consensus in this area [commercial policy], and also how important in practice that consensus
is.”290
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In this sense, in January 2000, the Commission’s Opinion291 clearly expressed that
any change in voting procedures to Article 133 (5) EC would not be the best option. Rather, a
better option would be the inclusion of services, intellectual property and investment into
Article 133 EC: “The Commission would prefer a substantial amendment of the scope of
Article 133 by extending it to services, investment and intellectual property rights.”292
France, on the contrary, had already opposed the idea of further broadening of EC powers in
the field of external trade during the Amsterdam Summit of 1997.
That said, it was in the best interest of the EC, nevertheless, to benefit from an IGC to
improve the EC’s ability to take international actions. In this sense, the European Council of
Feira in June 2000 decided to include the external trade policy on the agenda of the Nice
IGC. The European Council gave green light to the Presidency Report on IGC
negotiations.293 Here the Portuguese presidency argued that Article 133 (5) EC is part of
those provisions where Council decision by unanimity should be replaced by qualifiedmajority voting with regard to transfer of competence from national to supranational level.
Conversely, other Member States thought that it was not necessary to deal with this same
issue in Nice since it had already been in the Amsterdam Summit agenda.
In September 2000, a French Presidency note proposed three alternatives to Article
133 EC:
1. the inclusion of services, intellectual property rights and investment either by
amending Article 133 (1) EC or by adding a new paragraph 5 to cover new fields
to be defined by a Protocol;
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2. change of the voting procedure of Article 133 (5) EC so that the decision to
include agreements on trade in services and intellectual property rights would be
by qualified-majority vote as opposed to unanimity. The question was whether the
EC’s exclusive trade competence should be broadened to include issues such as
services and intellectual property rights, where competence is shared between the
EC and its Member States, or whether the catalogue of exceptions to the EC’s
exclusive trade competence (such as investment, services and intellectual property
rights) should remain. In the end, the answer was somewhere in between these
two positions; and lastly
3. a new Protocol establishing the rules for a common position in the WTO by
qualified-majority vote, without transfer of competence under Article 133 EC.

In November 2000, there were two options presented in the drafts for the new Treaty:
1) the inclusion of trade in services, investment and intellectual property rights in Article 133
(1) EC; 2) the creation of a Protocol for the extension of Article 133 EC to the negotiation
and conclusion of agreements on trade in services and intellectual property rights. In
December 2000, at the IGC, option 1 was the basis for the final text in Nice, including an
explicit reservation of Member State powers; option 2 (the creation of a Protocol) was
rejected. Since the Protocol on WTO participation was also dropped, there is no agreement
on a single procedure for all WTO negotiations, whether it is for issues of exclusive EC
competence, shared competence or Member States’ competence.
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B.- The EC Developments in Trade Policy at Nice

During the Nice negotiations, the French presidency played the most active and important
role: France wished to control the EC’s common commercial policy as much as possible by
insisting that there should be a specific exception for trade in cultural and audio-visual
services (the so-called specificite culturelle). This is one of the issues which explain the
result of the Nice Summit as far as the EC’s foreign trade policy is concerned. Five principal
issues were discussed in Nice: qualified-majority voting and the co-decision procedure, the
weighting of votes in the Council,294 the composition of the Commission, the composition of
the European Parliament, and closer cooperation. For the purposes of this article, I will only
mention the first one of them.

B.1.- Qualified-majority voting and the co-decision procedure295

The 1957 Treaty of Rome provided for a decision to be taken by unanimity in the EU
Council for most of the areas covered. However, a few provisions were already subject to
qualified-majority voting296 and the Treaty of Rome itself foresaw the mechanism of
294
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qualified-majority voting in many cases after the end of the transitional period in 1966. An
example of this period is the so-called France’s “empty chair,”297 when General De Gaulle
rejected a series of Commission proposals blocking their adoption in the Council and
refusing to move toward qualified-majority voting. This political crisis was resolved with the
Luxembourg compromise in January 1966.298 The Council had stated in its conclusions that
“where very important interests of one or more partners are at stake, the members of the
Council will endeavour, within a reasonable time, to reach solutions which can be adopted by
all […].” The immediate consequence of this event was the veto culture, which damaged
severely the process of European integration.
The Single European Act of 1987, the Council practice of 1985 and Maastricht
represent a reduction of Member State participation, by moving from unanimity to a
qualified-majority requirement. Weiler points out in his book The Constitution of Europe that
EC Member States are less willing today to accept ERTA-type decisions by the ECJ.299 In
theses decisions, EC Member States, by transferring sovereignty over a given issue to the
EC, implicitly acknowledged that the EC can exercise sovereignty over the issue at an
international level.300
The praxis of qualified-majority voting was seen as a necessary element for the
successive EU enlargements. Yet, several important and politically sensitive issues remained
subject to the unanimity rule. From Article 205 EC, we can infer that the EU Council acts by
in the Protocol is established by the Council.
297
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298
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a majority of its members, as provided by the EC Treaty. Therefore, de iure the simple
majority is the rule, whereas qualified majority and unanimity are the exception. However, de
facto it seems as if qualified-majority voting will be the rule, whereas unanimity and simple
majority will be the exceptions in the Council’s decision-making process. Leaving unanimity
aside as a common praxis in the Council is beneficial for an enlarged EU since it will become
virtually impossible to take unanimous decisions in an EU of over 30 countries.
At Nice, the discussions seemed to be based on three options:
1. qualified-majority voting as the general rule with limited exceptions listed
exhaustively;
2. issues to be transferred to qualified-majority voting with no exhaustive list of the
areas excluded; and
3. a case-by-case approach.

At the Nice IGC, the Commission proposed the first option. However, the case-by-case
approach prevailed.301
With respect to the co-decision procedure,302 it was introduced by the Maastricht Treaty
and then simplified by the Amsterdam Treaty. The aim was to strengthen the powers of the
European Parliament. The co-decision procedure is only applied for internal EC legislation,
not for international agreements. Yet, the European Parliament can give its approval in trade
agreements. In this sense, in the case of the WTO agreement, the EP has power to assent. The
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301
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Commission alerted the fact that there is inconsistency when combining unanimity in the EU
Council with the co-decision procedure. Thus, the Commission proposed instead the
harmony of qualified-majority voting and the co-decision procedure. In the eyes of the
Commission, commercial policy inter alia should come under the co-decision procedure.303
The Commission’s Opinion on the IGC in January 2000 suggested the extension of codecision to the common commercial policy.304 This proposal did not see the light because the
European Council refused to apply the principle of parallelism and, in the words of the
Commission, this failure to increase the role of the European Parliament in EU decisionmaking under Article 133 EC is “regrettable for the democratic accountability of the Union’s
trade policy.”305 Some authors refer to this phenomenon of lack of democratic legitimacy as
insufficient and inadequate parliamentary control.306 Nonetheless, the Treaty of Nice307
would amend Article 300 (6) EC in order to allow the European Parliament, the Council, the
Commission or a Member State to request an Opinion from the Court of Justice on the
compatibility of a given agreement with the Treaty.

B.2.- Changes made to Article 133 EC at Nice

During the Nice IGC, the European Commission had proposed to include in Article 133 (1)
303
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EC trade in goods, as well as services, investment and intellectual property rights.308 By
doing so, the pre-Nice Article 133 EC would extend to these areas. This proposal, however,
never saw the light, and instead Article 133 (5) of the Nice Treaty came into existence. As a
consequence, we can observe significant differences between Article 133 (1-4) EC and
Article 133 (5) EC.
What are, then, the implications of rejecting the European Commission’s proposal?
There are mainly two implications: 1) investments are excluded from Article 133 EC; and 2)
only the negotiation and conclusion (but not the implementation) of international agreements
is covered by the amended Article 133 EC. Furthermore, Article 133 (6.3) of the Nice Treaty
provides that the negotiation and conclusion of international agreements in the field of
transport remains being governed by the provisions of the EC Treaty on transport policy and
Article 300 EC. This is most likely due to some bureaucratic instance of various EU Member
States to leave transport out.
In a nutshell, the content of the new Article 133 EC post-Nice can be summarized as
follows:
1. reiteration of current provisions of Article 133 (1-4) EC. For example, there is a need
to ensure the compatibility of external agreements with internal policies and rules,
under joint responsibility of the Council and the Commission. Another example is the
fact that the Commission has the duty to consult the Article 133 Committee and to
report to the same Committee on the progress of negotiations;
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308
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2. extension of qualified-majority vote (QMV) for the negotiation and conclusion of
international agreements on trade in services and trade aspects of intellectual
property,309 except for agreements which include provisions for which unanimity is
required for the adoption of internal rules or which relate to a field in which the EC
has not yet exercised the powers conferred upon it by the Treaty by adopting internal
rules. Arguably, and I certainly believe it is the case, there has been progress in EC
trade policy-making by going from unanimity to QMV in the so-called shared
competence issues, thereby creating greater flexibility, as well as a trend toward an
EU federation, at least in the case of trade policy. Therefore, the Nice
Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) has taken into account the important changes
made to the world trading system and, consequently, is in line with the WTO’s idea
of including the GATS and the TRIPS Agreement as part of the WTO substantive
law;
3. joint conclusion by the EU Council (based on Article 300 EC) and the Member States
for agreements relating to trade in cultural and audiovisual services, educational
services, and social and human health services;
4. application of the existing procedure for agreements on transport.310 This corroborates
the European Court of Justice’s Opinion that transport services are not governed by
the provisions on the common commercial policy.311; and
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5. possibility of extending qualified-majority voting, by a unanimous EU Council
decision (after consultation of the European Parliament), to agreements on intellectual
property, except in certain derogations.

B.3.- What remains unchanged of Article 133 EC at Nice

Three main issues remained the same at Nice:
1. the European Parliament is formally excluded from decision-making under Article
133 EC. However, as Herrmann claims, since the Nice IGC failed to strengthen the
rights of the EP in relation to the common commercial policy, “at least the EP will
now be empowered to obtain an opinion by the ECJ under Article 3000 (6) EC, a
change that enhances the ability of the EP to protect its rights concerning
international agreements without having to wait for the Council to take a formal
decision about the conclusion of an agreement which could then be challenged under
Article 230 EC;”312
2. it is not entirely clear whether investment continues to be excluded from Article 133
EC, although some aspects of investment are covered by the locution “trade in
services.” In this sense, the uncertainty on the scope of Article 133 EC is created by
the fact that in the Nice negotiations all proposals to include an express mention of
“direct investment” alongside “trade in services” to paragraph 5 were rejected.313
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Against this view is the position of Torrent, who argues that in the GATS, investment
is deliberately camouflaged as “commercial presence;”314 and
3. the proposed Protocol on WTO participation was associated with a decision not to
transfer any competence to the EC under Article 133 EC.

B.4- The New Article 133 EC: More Unnecessary Confusion and Complication?

To understand the changes made to Article 133 in Nice, I shall focus on the so-called “logic
of parallelism.”315 One valid definition of the “logic of parallelism” is the idea that the EC’s
external powers with respect to trade in services and commercial aspects of intellectual
property need to correspond to the division of powers between the EC and its Member States
and to the voting procedures in the internal sphere. An example of the so-called “logic of
parallelism” is the grant of powers in paragraph 5, subparagraph 1, of Article 133 of the Nice
Treaty without prejudice to its paragraph 6, which provides that “an agreement may not be
concluded by the Council if it includes provisions which would go beyond the Community’s
internal powers.”316
Speaking of the text adopted by the European Council in Nice, the Commission
argues that,
“by focusing on the principle of parallelism on which it is based, it [the
text] becomes easier to understand. The guiding principle of the new
Article 133 is to align the decision-making mechanism for trade
negotiations on internal decision-making rules: in the area of services for
314
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example, it is illogical that decisions are taken by qualified majority on
internal Market directives, but trade negotiations on the very same
subject fall under a rule of consensus (effectively requiring
unanimity).”317

Within the EU, there is a parallelism between external and internal powers: from
paragraph 3 of Article 133 of the Nice Treaty, we see that the Commission and the Council
are responsible for ensuring that “agreements negotiated are compatible with internal
Community policies and rules.”318 Similarly, Article 300 (6) EC makes reference to Treatycompatibility and argues that agreements found to be incompatible with the Treaty would
only enter into force if and after there has been a Treaty amendment. This means that the EC
can actually negotiate and conclude agreements under Article 133 EC which requires
amendment of secondary legislation. Thus, as Cremona rightly points out, it would make
little sense to believe that “the Community could not negotiate any agreement that was not
compatible with Community law as it then stands (i.e. requiring no amendment of
Community law)”319 since this would imply a paralysis of external trade policy.
The internal policy objectives are relevant in determining trade policy positions. We
see this in the new paragraph 3 of Article 133 of the Nice Treaty. The new wording of
paragraph 3 of Article 133, which requires compatibility between the agreements negotiated
and internal Community policies and rules, is done to avoid the fear that the Community will
negotiate in sensitive internal policy sectors.
Parallelism is also dealt with in Article 133 (6) of the Nice Treaty, which prevents the
Council from concluding agreements with provisions which might go beyond the
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Community’s internal powers. Article 133 (5) (2) of the Nice Treaty shows examples of
decision-making parallelism.

B.5- Article 133 EC after Nice320

B.5.a.- Form and Substance

Although the common commercial policy has traditionally been regarded as one of the areas
of exclusive external EC competence,321 the new subparagraph 4 of paragraph 5 of Article
133 of the Nice Treaty makes an exception to this principle by preserving the Member
States’ right to maintain and conclude bilateral agreements with non-member countries or
international organizations on issues where there is no common interest to justify action by
the European Community.322
A second characteristic to Article 133 of the Nice Treaty that has to do with the
relationship between the Community’s powers and those of the Member States is its second
subparagraph of paragraph 6, which uses for the first time the locution “shared competence”
to refer to a situation where EC competence in respect of a given matter exists but is not
exclusive. The negotiation of agreements on issues such as trade in cultural and audiovisual
services, educational services, and social and human health services will require both a
Community decision and the Member States’ consensus.323 Those agreements on issues
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mentioned in Article 133 (6) (2) EC will be concluded jointly by the EC and its Member
States as mixed agreements.324
From a substance viewpoint, Article 133 (6) of the Nice Treaty alludes to the locution
“shared competence.” With regard to situations of shared competence, it might be decided by
the Council to exercise the Community’s non-exclusive competence over a given agreement,
leaving no room for Member States’ participation. Alternatively, if there is no Community
legislation in the field covered by the agreement, the Member States alone could conclude
the agreement without the Community. Both of these hypotheses are examples where the
agreement would be concluded only by the EC or by its Member States alone. A totally
different matter is the fact that, as Heliskoski argues, “in every field of Community policy
there is likely to be at least some Community legislation in place and, consequently, the
Community’s participation in the agreement alongside the Member States might become
necessary under the AETR principle.”325 That is why Heliskoski speaks of “unfortunate”326
when referring to the way in which Article 133 of the Nice Treaty uses the locution “shared
competence.”
With respect to trade in services, the scope has been enlarged so that the EC’s
competence to negotiate and conclude trade agreements related to Article 133 EC is not
restricted to the so-called “cross-border” supply of services but covers all types of supply.
The exceptions would be agreements in the field of transport, as has been explained above,327
and those agreements which lead to the harmonization of the laws or regulations of the
324
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Member States in an area which the Treaty rules out such harmonization, i.e., education,328
vocational training,329 culture,330 and public health.331 So services other than cultural,
audiovisual, educational, social and health services, have been brought under the scope of
Article 133 EC with the Nice Treaty.
As for intellectual property, paragraph (5) (1) is restrained to commercial aspects of
intellectual property. It is thus more restricted than Article 133 (5) of the Amsterdam Treaty.
This new provision would not enable the EC to negotiate and conclude international trade
agreements on intellectual property rights within organizations such as WIPO. During the
Nice negotiations, the spirit was to create a paragraph 5 with a scope similar to that of the
TRIPS Agreement; however, such proposals were later rejected.332

B.5.b.- Decision-making Procedures

Qualified-majority voting has been a major characteristic of the EC common commercial
policy’s decision-making process as much as has been the absence of European Parliament’s
involvement in the common commercial policy stricto sensu. Before Nice, the conclusion of
an agreement on issues of shared competence had to be done by unanimity, whereas
decision-making of internal legislation was by qualified-majority vote. After Nice, and with
EU enlargement in mind, the use of unanimity is only required in four situations:
1. where it is required for the adoption of internal rules;
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2. where powers have not yet been exercised by adoption of internal rules (Article 133
(5)(2) of the Nice Treaty);
3. agreements under the “cultural exception” clause of Article 133 (6) of the Nice Treaty
must be concluded by common accord between the EC and its Member States; and
4. horizontal agreements.
Thus, the whole point of Nice with respect to decision-making was to simplify the current
situation. Already in an EU of twenty-five Member States it is difficult to have unanimity, so
in an enlarged EU of over 25 it is virtually impossible to reach unanimity, despite the
sensitivities some Member States may have in certain fields. Leaving unanimity aside is a
political sacrifice that may need to be made in EU decision-making in the near future.

B.5.c.- Expansion of Exclusive EC Competence?

Although the scope of the common commercial policy was broadened in previous IGCs, with
agreements relating to trade in services and the commercial aspects of intellectual property
there has been no expansion to exclusive EC competence by the Nice Treaty; instead, there
has been the preservation of “shared competence.” In that same line of argument, Article 133
(5) (4) of the Nice Treaty gives Member States the right to “maintain and conclude
agreements with third countries or international organizations insofar as such agreements
comply with Community law and other relevant international agreements.” Thus, EC
competence does not stop the continuation of Member States competence in these fields.
Although this new competence will be shared, the Community will be able to act alone in
international trade negotiations.
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As for a different category of agreements on trade in services, a specific form of
shared competence will continue, where joint negotiation and conclusion of agreements by
the Community and its Member States in specific areas will be the normal praxis, as can be
seen in Article 133 (6) (2) of the Nice Treaty. According to the Treaty of Nice, the
Community alone will not be able to conclude agreements in these sectors: “Agreements thus
negotiated shall be concluded jointly by the Community and the Member States.”333 This also
applies to Member States’ inability to conclude such agreements alone. This means that
Member States will not lose their competence within the WTO forum.334
That said, where external competence is implied, the scope of exclusive external
powers may change. The ECJ, in its Opinion 1/94, held that exclusive implied powers in
trade in services might arise in two situations: 1) where internal harmonization is complete,
or 2) where legislation gives a specific competence to negotiate with third countries: “the
[exclusive competence] applies […] even in the absence of any express provision authorizing
its institutions to negotiate with non-member countries, where the Community has achieved
complete harmonization of the rules governing access to a self-employed activity […].”335
This means that the current situation could change if new secondary legislation gives
the EC exclusive powers in the common commercial policy or if harmonization is complete.
On the other hand, and contrary to this approach, the new paragraph 5 of Article 133 of the
Nice Treaty preserves Member State competence in the conclusion of mixed trade
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agreements. This can be summarized as a duty of close cooperation in the external relations
of the Communities in cases of shared competence.336

C.- The Outcome of Nice: Comments and Criticism

C.1.- Greater Transparency and Simplicity?

The common denominator to all IGC negotiations until Nice was the lack of transparency
and information. At Nice, the increasing demands for greater transparency and simplicity337
were not met by the new version of Article 133 EC. This new Article is a bad example of
simplification. Why is it not possible to simplify the Treaties so easily? One plausible answer
is because at the IGCs the political compromise is far too strong. In the case of Nice, most
EU Member States did not bring the scope of the EC’s commercial policy in line with the
scope of international economic law as it evolved from the conclusion of the WTO
Agreement.
Most commentators have pronounced their disappointment toward the amendment of
Article 133 envisaged by the Nice Treaty. The least pessimistic has been the Commission by
admitting that “the progress made in improving the operation of EU’s trade policy is
modest.”338 Pescatore calls it a “legal bricolage” and alerts us of the inevitable and imminent
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paralysis of the Community’s decisional processes which will hamper an effective defence of
the Community’s trade interests.339 The import of unanimity into the common commercial
policy risks the decisional paralysis announced by Pescatore; however, the import of shared
competence threatens the uniform principles of the common commercial policy expressed in
Article 133 (1) of the Nice Treaty.
If the criterion for measuring the success of the Nice Treaty has been, following
Piris’s words, an obvious and understandable need for “clear, simple, transparent, effective
legal rules,”340 then one could argue that Nice has failed to do its homework properly.
Despite the interest of the Commission to extend as much as possible qualified-majority
voting in the decision-making process for issues such as trade in services and intellectual
property rights, Member States have attempted to reflect as much as possible the current
situation with regard to distribution of competence in order to preserve the existing EU’s
decision-making modus operandi.
Many commentators341 argue that the Nice Treaty has accepted the outcome of
Opinion 1/94 of the ECJ: the new Article 133 after Nice preserves the same outcome as the
Opinion in the sense that there continues to be shared competence in the GATS and the
TRIPS Agreement.342 The enigma of EC trade policy on issues of trade in services and
intellectual property rights continues to stand up: Cremona argues in this sense that a
rethinking of the locution “uniform principles” as the basis of the EC common commercial

Frequently Asked Questions. Intergovernmental Conference discusses Article 133, December 2000,
http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/faqs/rev133_en.htm.
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See, among others, Pescatore, P. “Guest Editorial: Nice –Aftermath” (2001) 38 CMLRev 265; Krenzler, H.G.
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Affairs Review 6, 2001, pp. 291-313.
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policy will have to be done given the non-exclusive competence nature of services and
intellectual property rights. To have a common definition of common interest may be more
important and efficient in EC trade relations than uniform rules.343
In the words of the Nice European Council, Nice was about “how to establish and
monitor a more precise delimitation of powers between the EU and its Member States
reflecting the principle of subsidiarity.”344 The prevailing principle of Nice was that of quid
pro quo. In the case of the common commercial policy, France had to give concessions to
ensure parity with Germany in the decision-making process. The main issue at stake in Nice
was the division of responsibilities between the EU and its Member States, i.e., who does
what, the arrangements for the exercise of those responsibilities, and the balance of power
between Germany and France.345
The struggles over national representation in the EC institutions are, according to
Yataganas, “a sign of Member States’ mistrust of supranational decision-making procedures
in general.”346 There continues to be a clear democratic deficit in EC trade policy-making:
the European Parliament hardly plays a role. Despite the extension of its legislative
competences, the famous democratic deficit is still present. There is a need to democratize
the EU institutional framework. Or as it was said at the Nice Declaration on the future of the
Union, there is a “need to improve and monitor the democratic legitimacy and transparency
of the Union and its institutions, to bring them closer to the citizens of the Member States.”
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The European Parliament was the big loser in the new Article 133 EC. It was not
given any new rights at the Nice Summit, not even a formal right of consultation, even if
Article 133 (7) EC provides that the EP be consulted concerning the negotiation and
conclusion of international agreements on intellectual property rights. So an informal
information procedure remains. However, Herrmann argues that the EP must be consulted if
an agreement within the meaning of Article 133 (6.2) EC is to be concluded.347 It seems
contradictory to grant a right of consultation to the EP in an area where the treaty-making
power is shared between the EC and its Member States whereas such a right to be consulted
does not exist in an area that comes under the EC’s exclusive competence. That said, it must
also be mentioned that the EP will be entitled to ask the ECJ to render an Opinion on the
compatibility of an international agreement with the EC Treaty, according to Article 133 (6)
EC.
As for the Council, the proposal that it would have a greater say in negotiations along
with the Commission was not supported. This would have meant a double EC representation
in international agreements, against one of the great advantages of Article 133 EC, i.e., that
the EC speaks with a single voice. Had this happened, it would have enabled the EC’s
negotiating partners to play off the EC negotiators against each other with all negative
consequences for the EC’s capacity as an international actor. A clear example of this is the
EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), which is bicephalous in nature: it is
represented by the High Representative of the Common Foreign and Security Policy and by
the EC commissioner responsible for external relations in cross-pillar matters.
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C.2.- The Extension of qualified-majority voting and co-decision procedures

Majority voting seems to be a fair rule when aggregating the diverse interests among the EU
Member States into a coherent common position for trade negotiations. However, antiglobalization activists before and during the December 2000 Nice summit claimed that
majority voting was not legitimate because, viewed from the perspective of the outcome, it
tends to produce more liberal and less protectionist policies. That explains why many nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) were so insistent at the Nice summit that France did not
lose its veto right on trade in cultural goods, but instead preserve in the Nice Treaty the socalled cultural exception clause. Some decisions made by majority vote may affect a minority
so negatively that the outcome may seem illegitimate. This justifies the preservation of the
veto right or consensus in some areas of EC trade policy, such as agriculture, even when the
default formal rules laid out in the treaties may state otherwise, in order to protect the right of
minorities. However, the need to achieve consensus or unanimity may lead to unfair results.
With the EU as an ongoing process, unanimity might pose more problems in terms of
political legitimacy since the degree of heterogeneity among the EU Member States is
expected to increase as future enlargements take place. This is true for agriculture (consensus
vote) or cultural services (unanimity requirement): finding a consensus will be harder with an
increased number of potential vetoes resulting from an enlarged EU.
With this background in mind, the new Article 133 EC enables the EC to conclude
international agreements on trade in services and intellectual property rights by qualifiedmajority voting and without ratification by the Member States.348 Nonetheless, there is a need
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for unanimity if only one of the services sectors or intellectual property rights covered by the
agreement comes under Article 133 (5.2) EC. Moreover, ratification by the EU Member
States is required if one of the services sectors in question comes under Article 133 (6.2) EC.
Consequently, only agreements on specific services sectors, such as the GATS protocols on
telecommunications or financial services, can be concluded in accordance with the rules of
Article 133 (1-4) EC.
The scope of agreements on the commercial aspects of intellectual property rights is
rather far reaching due to the dynamic relationship with the TRIPS Agreement. However,
since the EC has not yet enacted internal rules in several areas of intellectual property rights,
agreements on intellectual property rights where there are not yet internal EC rules, they
must be concluded by unanimous decision within the EU Council. With respect to foreign
direct investment, the Commission did not succeed in including it in the scope of the EC’s
common commercial policy.
After Nice, all EU Member States agreed that, out of the 75 cases where the EC
Treaty still required unanimity, consensus must continue to be the rule in only 25 of those
cases; for the remaining 50 cases, it was considered by the Portuguese and French
presidencies that unanimity should be replaced by qualified-majority voting.349 In the end,
qualified-majority voting was introduced in only 27 Articles out of the original 50 proposed
by the Commission.350

349

In this sense, the Constitutional Treaty went further by creating the so-called “transition clause,” which has
two main objectives: firstly, it enables the EU Council to act by qualified majority, instead of unanimity, in the
areas of Part III of the EU Constitutional Treaty. The Council can adopt, on its own initiative and unanimously,
a European decision authorizing the EU Council to act unanimously in a specific field. When applying this
clause, national parliaments must be informed more than four months prior to the decision’s initial
implementation; secondly, the transition clause enables the EU Council, acting unanimously, to extend the codecision procedure to new areas. This clause is one of the provisions which enable the long-term adaptation of
the Constitutional Treaty, in the same way as the flexibility clause, or the review procedure.
350
For a list of the 27 Articles where unanimity has been changed by qualified-majority voting, see Commission

96

Rafael Leal-Arcas

There were five sensitive areas in which transition to qualified-majority voting was
important for an enlarged EU. Without intending to enter into the details of any single one of
them, these were:
1. the coordination of social security schemes for cross-border workers and minimum
requirements in social policy (Articles 42 & 137 EC; opposition from the British
government);
2. visas, asylum and immigration issues (Article 67 EC);
3. taxation (Article 93 EC; opposition from the British government);
4. the services and industrial property aspects of the common commercial policy
(Article 133 EC; strong opposition from the French government); and
5. the financing of economic and social cohesion policy (Article 161 EC).

With regard to EC trade policy, France showed its eternal problem with culture in the
sense that the French government refused the idea of getting rid of commercial policy
exemptions for cultural issues (the so-called specificite culturelle). The final deal was to
allow trade in services to be decided by qualified-majority voting, but only after accepting
exemptions for France in culture and audiovisual services. The French and other delegations
of EU Member States negotiated long hours to come up with the new Article 133 of the Nice
Treaty. The European Commission had campaigned over 10 years to obtain more freedom to
lead international trade in services negotiations for the EU at the GATT/WTO. The final
compromise was the inclusion of the negotiation and conclusion of international agreements
on trade in services and commercial aspects of intellectual property. These agreements are

of the European Communities, Secretary-General, “List of provisions to which the qualified majority rules will
apply,” CONFER 4706/1/00 REV 1.
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concluded by qualified-majority voting, except when they include “provisions for which
unanimity is required for the adoption of internal rules or where it relates to a field in which
the Community has not yet exercised the powers conferred upon it by this Treaty by adopting
internal rules.”351 Furthermore, “agreements relating to trade in cultural and audiovisual
services, educational services, and social and human health services shall fall within the
shared competence of the Community and its Member States.”352
The interests of an EU Member State can be subordinated to the national interests that
may be vital to another EU Member State. Most national policy-makers recognize that, one
day, they could be in the difficult position of their colleagues, and are therefore happy to
keep the veto power. It is therefore no surprise to see the current trend by a majority of EU
Member States to expand the rule of unanimity in decision-making in the new areas of trade
policy. This trend, however, can question democratically speaking the fairness of an
arrangement according to which the blocking minority always gets its way (tyranny of the
minority, following by analogy Tocqueville’s famous sentence). The alternative situation to
unanimity is qualified majority vote. Given that the voting weight is far from proportional to
the country’s population, it favors smaller EU countries. This brings serious doubts as to the
qualified majority vote option. So both options show problems of democratic deficit,
damaging thereby the legitimacy of the EU.
It is pertinent to mention that the draft Treaty presented at the beginning of the Nice
Summit in December 2000 included a Protocol on the participation of the EC and its Member
States in the framework of the WTO under Article 133(4).353 This text made an effort at
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better defining the roles of the EC and its Member States in areas of shared competence. Yet,
this useful text was unfortunately not included in the final draft.354
Co-decision will only be applicable in seven Articles355 that have changed from
unanimity to qualified-majority voting. Unfortunately, the Nice IGC was not capable of
extending the co-decision procedure to measures that already exist under the qualifiedmajority rule, such as trade or agriculture.
In conclusion, the Treaty of Nice only represents a small step forward in strengthening
the EC’s capacity to act on the international sphere. Many negative aspects of the ECJ’s
Opinion 1/94 have been codified by the new Article 133 EC. The negotiation and conclusion
of significant international agreements, be they bilateral or multilateral, is subject to
unanimous decision within the Council and ratification by the Member States. There was no
solution towards obtaining a more extensive EC’s exclusive competence to reach trade in
services, intellectual property rights and investment.
With respect to the unanimity requirement, it enables third countries to exert influence on
single Member States. This, in an enlarged EC of over 25 members in the future, could be
detrimental for its capacity to act internationally. It is then clear that national sovereignty has
gained over efficiency in foreign trade.356 The EC’s negotiating power, in comparison to that
of the U.S. or Japan, has therefore been reduced, or at least not strengthened in a meaningful
manner. This will not enable the EC to properly respond to the challenges of globalization
and the world trading system.
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VI.- The Constitutional Treaty’s Proposals for External Trade Policy357

In relation to challenges ahead, as the EC has started this new millennium, it has been facing
institutional and policy changes in accordance with today’s international relations reality.
The 1997 Amsterdam Treaty postponed major EC institutional reforms so a change is
inevitable in the near future in order for the EC to survive and maintain credibility as an
international actor.358 This is also the case of trade policy, even if it is one of the most
integrated policies within the EC. Policy-makers in the EC will soon have to face an
expanded Union of 27 to 30 Members, which will not be homogeneous since they will not
have the same macroeconomic level and yet a way must be found to make the EU institutions
work productively.
After the adoption of the Nice Treaty, EU Member States felt the need to call a
Convention on the Future of Europe, inter alia, to further extend voting by qualified majority
in the EU Council. One of the main motivations to resume the work done at the Nice IGC
was the risk of blocking the EU institutions. The Convention on the Future of Europe tried to
reduce a maximum of areas where EU Member States retain their veto power in the sectors
which concern them, such as taxation in the case of the UK or education in France.
The first attempt to ratification of the EU Constitutional Treaty has failed. It is
somewhat paradoxical that in the period since the collapse of the Berlin Wall, at precisely the
357
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time in which there were few credible alternatives to liberal democracy, there have been
growing doubts about the capacity of the structures and institutions of liberal democracy to
respond to contemporary problems.359 Although the EU Constitutional Treaty will most
likely not enter into force360 before the conclusion of the Doha Development Agenda,361 it
seems nevertheless relevant to analyze the impact of the Constitutional Treaty on the EC’s
external trade policy.362 With respect to the input given by the Convention on the Future of
Europe363 and, consequently, the EU Constitutional Treaty, they both try to timidly improve
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the current situation on trade issues created by the Nice IGC. The main innovation introduced
by the EU Constitutional Treaty is to specify the various types of competence that exist in the
EU, which has never done in any of the previous Treaties.364 Thus, the Union's external trade
policy will become more federal,365 but not necessarily more democratic, even if the
European Parliament will have more powers in relation to the conclusion of international
trade agreements. The empowerment of the European Parliament is overweighed by the fact
that national parliaments will not part take in the ratification of trade agreements. Therefore,
the Constitutional Treaty improves some aspects of the current EC's common commercial
policy, but creates new (unnecessary) problems.

A.- The Constitutional Treaty and International Services Trade

The EU Constitutional Treaty has given more competences in trade policy to the
supranational level, which causes problems for national governments. In practice, the
problems arise because there is no definition or scope of the common commercial policy in
the EU Constitutional Treaty. Therefore, if a given agreement is on a subject of national
regulation, then it will have to be signed as a mixed agreement, even under the EU
Constitutional Treaty.

connect with civil society.
364
The ECJ, however, had already prefigured such a categorization in that it defines three types of competences:
exclusive, shared, and complementary.
365
The general rule laid down in Article I-13 of the Constitutional Treaty is that the Union has exclusive
competence for the conclusion of an international agreement in areas defined by European legislative acts, when
the competence is necessary to enable the Union to exercise its internal competence, or affects an internal Union
act. This praxis gives a federal approach to the Union in trade agreements.
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Part III of the Constitutional Treaty (The Policies and Functioning of the Union) deals
in its Title V (The Union’s External Action) with the common commercial policy (Chapter
III). With respect to the common commercial policy, Articles III-314366 and 315367 of the EU
Constitutional Treaty deal with the common commercial policy and state that the common
commercial policy includes “the conclusion of tariff and trade agreements relating to trade in
366

Article III-314 of the Constitutional Treaty reads: By establishing a customs union in accordance with
Article III-151, the Union shall contribute, in the common interest, to the harmonious development of world
trade, the progressive abolition of restrictions on international trade and on foreign direct investment, and the
lowering of customs and other barriers.
367
Article III-315 of the Constitutional Treaty reads:
1. The common commercial policy shall be based on uniform principles, particularly with regard to changes in
tariff rates, the conclusion of tariff and trade agreements relating to trade in goods and services, and the
commercial aspects of intellectual property, foreign direct investment, the achievement of uniformity in
measures of liberalisation, export policy and measures to protect trade such as those to be taken in the event of
dumping or subsidies. The common commercial policy shall be conducted in the context of the principles and
objectives of the Union's external action.
2. European laws shall establish the measures defining the framework for implementing the common
commercial policy.
3. Where agreements with one or more third countries or international organisations need to be negotiated and
concluded, Article III-325 shall apply, subject to the special provisions of this Article.
The Commission shall make recommendations to the Council, which shall authorise it to open the necessary
negotiations. The Council and the Commission shall be responsible for ensuring that the agreements negotiated
are compatible with internal Union policies and rules.
The Commission shall conduct these negotiations in consultation with a special committee appointed by the
Council to assist the Commission in this task and within the framework of such directives as the Council may
issue to it. The Commission shall report regularly to the special committee and to the European Parliament on
the progress of negotiations.
4. For the negotiation and conclusion of the agreements referred to in paragraph 3, the Council shall act by a
qualified majority.
For the negotiation and conclusion of agreements in the fields of trade in services and the commercial aspects of
intellectual property, as well as foreign direct investment, the Council shall act unanimously where such
agreements include provisions for which unanimity is required for the adoption of internal rules.
The Council shall also act unanimously for the negotiation and conclusion of agreements:
(a) in the field of trade in cultural and audiovisual services, where these agreements risk prejudicing the Union's
cultural and linguistic diversity;
(b) in the field of trade in social, education and health services, where these agreements risk seriously disturbing
the national organisation of such services and prejudicing the responsibility of Member States to deliver them.
5. The negotiation and conclusion of international agreements in the field of transport shall be subject to Section
7 of Chapter III of Title III and to Article III-325.
6. The exercise of the competences conferred by this Article in the field of the common commercial policy shall
not affect the delimitation of competences between the Union and the Member States, and shall not lead to
harmonisation of legislative or regulatory provisions of the Member States insofar as the Constitution excludes
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goods and services and the commercial aspects of intellectual property, foreign direct
investment” (paragraph 1).368 The text in italics was added to the text of the first paragraph of
the current version of Article 133 of the Nice Treaty. This makes it very clear that goods,
services, intellectual property rights and investment would be covered by the common
commercial policy and would therefore fall within the exclusive competence of the EU. The
transfer of areas of decision-making to the supranational level weakens the national interests
in the various EU Member States.369 Compared to the Nice Treaty, the scope would be
increased in two aspects: firstly, the exception concerning cultural and audiovisual services,
educational services, and social and human health services would be removed; and secondly,
investment would be included in the scope of the common commercial policy.
Although the Union will gain a comprehensive external competence, covering
thereby all fields of the world trading system, Article III-315 of the Constitutional Treaty
does not provide the Union with full internal competence to adopt legislation to implement
trade agreements. This means that the Union would need to coordinate with EU Member
States before trade agreements can be concluded. Furthermore, the implementation of an
international agreement by the Union will put political pressure on EU Member States to
adopt that piece of legislation. Since EU Member States will only have a formal competence
to implement international agreements, it will not leave them a large margin of discretion,
though. Given that Article III-315 of the Constitution, as it stands, would remove any shared
competence in EC trade policy (services and commercial aspects of intellectual property
rights), it would exclude national parliaments from ratifying any future WTO agreements.
Therefore, EU national parliaments would see their influence on trade policy minimized.
such harmonisation.
368
Article III-315 (1) of the Constitutional Treaty.

104

Rafael Leal-Arcas

However, as we will see below, the cultural exception in services trade will remain, but in a
different form, giving a veto power to EU Member States in specific circumstances (Article
III-315-4(a) of the EU Constitutional Treaty).
When analyzing the EU Constitutional Treaty, we note that there are areas where the
Union may take coordinating, complementary or supporting action, i.e., public health, culture
or education.370 This seems to be in direct confrontation with the commitments of the
Constitutional Treaty in international trade policy (Articles III-314 and 315).
In trade policy, the distinction between qualified majority371 and unanimity in the
Council remains in the Constitutional Treaty, depending on the area of trade policy. The
voting requirements of decision-making in the EU Council appear in Article III-315 (4) of
369
370

Weiler, J.H.H., Un’Europa Cristiana. Un Saggio Esplorativo, Biblioteca Universale Rizzoli, 2003, p. 173.
See Article I-17 of the Constitutional Treaty, which reads:

The Union shall have competence to carry out supporting, coordinating or complementary action. The areas of
such action shall, at European level, be:
(a) protection and improvement of human health;
(b) industry;
(c) culture;
(d) tourism;
(e) education, youth, sport and vocational training;
(f) civil protection;
(g) administrative cooperation.
See also Article III-278 (1) of the Constitutional Treaty, which reads:
1. A high level of human health protection shall be ensured in the definition and implementation of all the
Union's policies and activities.
Action by the Union, which shall complement national policies, shall be directed towards improving public
health, preventing human illness and diseases, and obviating sources of danger to physical and mental health.
Such action shall cover:
(a) the fight against the major health scourges, by promoting research into their causes, their transmission
and their prevention, as well as health information and education;
(b) monitoring, early warning of and combating serious cross-border threats to health.
The Union shall complement the Member States' action in reducing drug-related health damage, including
information and prevention.
371
Article I-25 (1) of the Constitutional Treaty defines qualified majority:
1. A qualified majority shall be defined as at least 55 % of the members of the Council, comprising at least
fifteen of them and representing Member States comprising at least 65 % of the population of the Union.
A blocking minority must include at least four Council members, failing which the qualified majority shall be
deemed attained.
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the Constitutional Treaty.372 The idea of the Convention was to provide for the use of
qualified majority voting as a rule. However, the Convention version of Article III-315 did
not specifically mention it. This was rectified by adding a subparagraph in Article III-315
(4): “for the negotiation and conclusion of the agreements referred to in paragraph 3, the
Council shall act by qualified majority.” This seems to suggest that only the negotiation and
conclusion of international agreements shall be subject to the majority rule, but not the
adoption of unilateral actions and the implementation of agreements. Nevertheless, majority
voting is already in the Nice Treaty the general rule for the exercise of powers in the field of
commercial policy.373 Thus, the proposed provision should be interpreted in such a way that
majority voting applies as a general rule, subject to the exceptions provided for in
subparagraphs 2 and 3 of Article III-315 (4). That said, a trade agreement which includes
issues that require unanimity and qualified majority will be concluded by unanimous vote in
the EU Council according to the pastis374 principle.375

372

Article III-315 (4) of the Constitutional Treaty reads:
For the negotiation and conclusion of the agreements referred to in paragraph 3, the Council shall act by a
qualified majority.
For the negotiation and conclusion of agreements in the fields of trade in services and the commercial aspects of
intellectual property, as well as foreign direct investment, the Council shall act unanimously where such
agreements include provisions for which unanimity is required for the adoption of internal rules.
The Council shall also act unanimously for the negotiation and conclusion of agreements:
(a) in the field of trade in cultural and audiovisual services, where these agreements risk prejudicing the Union's
cultural and linguistic diversity;
(b) in the field of trade in social, education and health services, where these agreements risk seriously disturbing
the national organisation of such services and prejudicing the responsibility of Member States to deliver them.
373
Article 133 (4) EC: “in exercising the powers conferred upon it by this Article, the Council shall act by
qualified majority.”
374
Pastis is an anise-flavored liqueur and aperitif from France, typically containing 40-45% alcohol by volume,
although there exist alcohol-free varieties. Pastis is normally diluted with water before drinking (generally 5
volumes of water for 1 volume of pastis). The resulting decrease in alcohol percentage causes some of the
constituents to become insoluble, which changes the liqueur's appearance from dark transparent yellow to milky
soft yellow.
375
According to Lamy, “…under the Pastis principle, a little drop of unanimity can taint the entire glass of
QMV [qualified majority vote] water,” argued in a speech given in Brussels, “The Convention and trade policy:
concrete
steps
to
enhance
the
EU’s
international
profile,”
available
at
http://
http://europa.eu.int/comm/archives/commission_1999_2004/lamy/speeches_articles/spla146_en.htm
(last
visited January 8, 2006).
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More competences have been given to the EU in trade matters with the EU
Constitutional Treaty. So does the EU Constitutional Treaty provide protection against
liberalization when national interests are at stake? When analyzing the EU Constitutional
Treaty, it might be argued that the following Articles protect the rights of the Member States
to determine policy on health, education, and cultural/audiovisual services: Articles I-17, III278 on public health, III-280 on culture, III-282 on education, III-315-4 of the common
commercial policy on cultural and audiovisual services, and III-315-5 of the common
commercial policy on the delineation of the competences of Member States as against those
of the EU. However, these Articles offer little legal protection against the provisions of
Article I-13-1(e),376 which gives the Union the exclusive right to determine the EU’s
common commercial policy, and Article III-315-1 of the common commercial policy, which
includes the right to make “trade agreements relating to trade in goods and services.”
This element of the common commercial policy allows the Commission, after a
qualified majority vote in the Council of Ministers, to make deals in the GATS and the WTO
Agreement on what the Commission itself defines as the commercial aspects of these
services. The commercial aspects of these services are not defined in the EU Constitutional
Treaty or elsewhere. The implication of this is that an EU Member State would have to go to
the European Court of Justice to challenge the Commission, arguing a defense that would
376

Article I-13 of the Constitutional Treaty reads:

1. The Union shall have exclusive competence in the following areas:
(a) customs union;
(b) the establishing of the competition rules necessary for the functioning of the internal market;
(c) monetary policy for the Member States whose currency is the euro;
(d) the conservation of marine biological resources under the common fisheries policy;
(e) common commercial policy.
2. The Union shall also have exclusive competence for the conclusion of an international agreement when its
conclusion is provided for in a legislative act of the Union or is necessary to enable the Union to exercise its
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have to show that the Commission was opening trade in non-commercial aspects of these
services. This would be a very difficult legal argument to make, since many parts of these
services can be broken into individual functions and contracted out. Examples of this can be
seen in Ireland and the UK. In practice, the above-mentioned protection Articles are but a
fig-leaf covering the overriding drive toward uniform liberalization of trade in services
contained in the common commercial policy. If those who cite these Articles are serious
about protecting health, education, and cultural/audiovisual services from
commercialization, they should at least press for the retention of the unanimity requirement
in the Council of Ministers on decisions to open trade in these services.
With regard to culture and audiovisual services, Article III-315-4(a) of the EU
Constitutional Treaty gives a veto on changes in the common commercial policy only in the
“conclusion of agreements in the field of trade in cultural and audiovisual services, where
these agreements risk prejudicing the Union’s cultural and linguistic diversity.” How such
risk is defined, when it is defined, and by whom it is defined, is open to interpretation. Would
a general opening up of the University sector, or of the primary school sector (as is
happening in the UK), to unlimited competition pose a threat to cultural and linguistic
diversity? For instance, in the case of Ireland, would the same levels of support to
linguistically specific radio and TV –like TG4377 and projects it supports– also have to be
given to private commercial channels like TV3378? How would defenders of linguistic
diversity establish, in advance -rather than when deals have been made and the damage is
already done- that certain trade agreements pose risks to culture? Who decides what
internal competence, or insofar as its conclusion may affect common rules or alter their scope.
377
TG4 is an Irish television channel aimed at Irish language speakers and established as a wholly owned
subsidiary by Radio Telefis Eireann on October 31, 1996. It was known as Teilifís na Gaeilge or TnaG before a
rebranding campaign in 1999.
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constitutes a risk is not defined in the EU Constitutional Treaty, so those who might see their
culture as being at risk will not have veto powers. Certainly, EU Member States will continue
to participate in the EU’s trade policy whenever there is a national regulation sector that the
European Commission neither controls nor knows about when it comes to national
preoccupations. In practice, the European Court of Justice will determine which services
should be protected and which should be commercialized.

B.- The Union’s Exclusive Competence in Trade Policy

Part I, Title III (Articles I-11 to I-18) of the Constitutional Treaty379 deals with the division of
competences between the Union and the Member States. It presents a threefold
classification: exclusive competence/shared competence/supporting action.380 However,
Title III does not seek to allocate competences in the way that a federal constitution might.381
It is debatable how far Title III fulfils the demands of the Laeken European Council. The

378

TV3 Ireland is the sole commercial terrestrial television channel in the Republic of Ireland.
Official Journal of the European Union C 310, Volume 47, 16 December 2004, available at
http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/lex/JOHtml.do?uri=OJ:C:2004:310:SOM:EN:HTML (last visited December 23,
2004).
380
In relation to the exclusive competences of the Union, the EU can legislate alone and adopt legally binding
acts in areas of exclusive competence (or authorize the Member States to do so). In areas of competences shared
between the EU and its Member States, both can intervene. The areas of support, coordination or
complimentary action open to the Union’s competence are: industry; protection and improvement of human
health; education, vocational training, youth and sport; tourism; administrative cooperation; culture; and civil
protection. In these areas, the legally binding acts adopted by the Union (law, framework law, regulation and
decision) on the basis of provisions specific to these areas, may not entail harmonization of Member States’
laws or regulations. The Constitutional Treaty also recognizes the Union’s competence for the definition and
establishment of a common foreign and security policy, including the progressive definition of a common
defense policy. However, the Constitutional Treaty does not give details about Member States’ competences, in
other words, areas in which the Union cannot intervene. That said, however, it is clear that “the rest” of
competences which are omitted is Member States’ competences.
381
See the German experience of a clear division of competences between the Federal level and the Laender
level in Title VII of the Fundamental Law for the Federal Republic of Germany of May 23rd 1949, especially
Articles 70-75.
379
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basic threefold classification may be controversial, not the least the definition of exclusive
competence.382
Part I, Title III of the Constitutional Treaty (The Union’s competences) accepts the fact
that it would be futile to attempt to compile an exhaustive catalogue of Union competences.
Rather it adopts a two-sided approach: firstly, it entails the restatement and strengthening of
the fundamental principles that organize the relationship between Union and Member State
powers; and, secondly, defining with greater precision than at present the different kinds of
competence available to the Union. Since external trade policy is an exclusive competence in
the eyes of the EU Constitutional Treaty, let us focus on exclusive competence, which is
defined in Article I-13 of the Constitutional Treaty.

•

Article I-13

Article I-13 seeks to describe and define those areas where the Union has exclusive
competence. This new Article may be controversial, especially for the relationship between
the Union and the Member States, but also for the involvement of national parliaments in the
control of Union legislation.383 It deals with internal competence384 and external

382

Article I-13 of the Constitutional Treaty.
In fact, the Protocol on the role of the EU’s national parliaments attempts to clarify relations between
national representatives and the EU institutions. The protocol states that, when the European Council uses the
procedure laid down in Article I-24 (4)(2) –meaning that when a Council Decision opens a new area to vote at
qualified majority- the national parliaments must be notified at least four months prior to the first vote in that
area. The Constitutional Treaty also clarifies and organizes the national parliament’s information mechanisms,
which for a long time were informal or falling under the Amsterdam Protocol. The EU institutions are obliged
to forward documents. For example, the Commission sends all its consultation documents, its annual legislative
program or legislative proposals. It also contains a constitutional recognition of the Conference of bodies
specialized in EC affairs, which is the link between national parliaments and the European Parliament.
384
Article I-13 (1).
383
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competence.385 These are two separate but related subjects: it is possible for the Union to
have exclusive external competence in an area where the Union and its Member States have
shared internal competence under the Treaty.386 In other words, issues of shared competence
may potentially become exclusive EU competence.387
The Union is said to have exclusive competence to establish “the competition rules
necessary for the functioning of the internal market,” as well as in the areas of customs
union, common commercial policy, monetary policy for the Member States which have
adopted the Euro, and fisheries conservation.388 The list in paragraph 1 of the areas of the
Constitution in which the Union has exclusive competence goes beyond the present situation,
as it includes the entire common commercial policy. Since Article I-13 does not define the
scope of the common commercial policy, it is only by reading the relevant Article in Part III
of the Constitutional Treaty that one discovers that the EU’s exclusive competence is being
extended compared to the Nice Treaty. This means that Article 133 (6), subparagraph (2) of
the Nice Treaty should be deleted, unless we give a different definition to the common

385

Article I-13 (2).
According to Article I-14 of the Constitutional Treaty, the Union has shared competence with the Member
States on issues of common safety concerns in public health matters, as well as in the following issues: the
internal market; areas of freedom, security and justice; agriculture and fisheries, excluding the conservation of
marine biological resources; transport and trans-European networks; energy; social policy for aspects defined in
Part III of the Constitutional Treaty; economic, social and territorial cohesion; common safety concerns in
public health matters, for the aspects defined in Part III; the environment; and consumer protection. The
Constitutional Treaty also includes two other areas: 1) research, technological development and space, for
which the Union has competence to take actions without stopping Member States from doing so; and 2) in the
areas of development cooperation and humanitarian aid, the Union can coordinate a common policy. However,
the Union can only support, coordinate or complement Member States’ action in the area of civil defense.
Taxation remains one of the Member States’ competences, even though the VAT rate and base are harmonized
at the European level. Also, administrative cooperation is recognized as a common interest question in Article
III-285 of the Constitutional Treaty, for which the Union can support efforts made by Member States to
improve their administrative capacity to establish Union law. No Member State is obliged to use this support.
387
House of Lords, Select Committee on the European Union, “The Future of Europe: Constitutional Treaty–
Draft Articles 1-16,” Session 2002-03, 9th Report, 25 February 2003, p. 19.
388
Article I-13 (1) of the Constitutional Treaty.
386
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commercial policy, far from the current one.389 The EU Constitutional Treaty will repeal the
existing treaties entirely, if it enters into force, and therefore will deal with this problem.
Antoniadis, however, has a more skeptical approach on the Constitutional
Convention’s proposals in this matter. According to him, the designation of the common
commercial policy as an exclusive Union competence does not insulate the system from
external threats, and thus perpetuates the constitutional conflicts between the EC and its
Member States in trade policy with regard to services trade and the commercial aspects of
intellectual property rights.390 Why is this the case? Because EU Member States still retain
competence to legislate over matters pertaining to the internal market. These measures are
destined to have a trade impact and, more importantly, may be incompatible with the WTO
Agreements. For example, let us think of a case involving national patent law which offers
limited protection, thereby violating the TRIPS Agreement. Or a situation in which the law
provides restrictions to the establishment of third country service providers, violating thereby
the GATS.
Another reason that explains why the designation of the common commercial policy
as an exclusive Union competence only perpetuates the constitutional conflicts between the
389

Article 133 (6) of the Nice Treaty reads:
An agreement may not be concluded by the Council if it includes provisions which would go beyond
the Community’s internal powers, in particular by leading to harmonization of the laws or regulations of the
Member States in an area for which this Treaty rules out such harmonization.
In this regard, by way of derogation form the first subparagraph of paragraph 5, agreements relating to trade in
cultural and audiovisual services, educational services, and social and human health services, shall fall within
the shared competence of the Community and its Member States. Consequently, in addition to a Community
decision taken in accordance with the relevant provisions of Article 300, the negotiation of such agreements
shall require the common accord of the Member States. Agreements thus negotiated shall be concluded jointly
by the Community and the Member States.

The negotiation and conclusion of international agreements in the field of transport shall continue to be
governed by the provisions of Title V and Article 300.
390
Antoniadis, A. “The Participation of the European Community in the World Trade Organization: An
External Look at European Union Constitution-Building,” in Tridimas, T. & Nebbia, P. European Union Law
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EC and its Member States in trade policy with regard to services trade and the commercial
aspects of intellectual property rights is the fact that EU Member States remain members of
the WTO of their own right. This means that any other WTO member may request the
establishment of a WTO Panel against any given EU Member State, and not against the EC
(despite the exclusivity of the Union in the common commercial policy).391 If that particular
EU Member State is found in violation of WTO law, it must repeal its legislation. In some
cases, it may then not have the competence to do so domestically; in other cases, in doing so,
it may violate EC law, and be found between conflicting legal obligations.
The Convention on the Future of Europe gave birth to the Constitutional Treaty. The
tasks of the Convention were set by the Laeken Declaration,392 which asked the Convention
to consider “how the division of competence can be made more transparent,” “whether there
needs to be any reorganization of competence” as well as “how to ensure a redefined division
of competence” and to ensure European dynamism at the same time. After analyzing the new
definition of the scope of EU trade policy by the Constitutional Treaty, more work may be
needed to secure an adequate level of transparency required by the Laeken Declaration. As
for the right balance between the maintenance of any “redefined division of competence” and
ensuring that “the European dynamic does not come to a halt,” one has to look at Article I-18
of the Constitutional Treaty,393 entitled “Flexibility clause.”394

for the 21st Century: Rethinking the New Legal Order, Vol. I, Hart Publishing, 2004, pp. 321-344, at 337.
391
However, dispute settlement body practice in the WTO dictates that WTO Member States tend to bring
actions against the EC, not against individual EU countries, even in areas of shared competence.
392
Laeken Declaration on the Future of the European Union of 15 December 2001, available at http://europeanconvention.eu.int/pdf/LKNEN.pdf (last visited June 30, 2005).
393
Article I-18 of the Constitutional Treaty reads:
1. If action by the Union should prove necessary, within the framework of the policies defined in Part III, to
attain one of the objectives set out in the Constitution, and the Constitution has not provided the necessary
powers, the Council of Ministers, acting unanimously on a proposal from the European Commission and after
obtaining the consent of the European Parliament, shall adopt the appropriate measures.2. Using the procedure
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VII. Conclusions

With the EU Constitutional Treaty, major changes will arrive. However, one could say that,
before the EU Constitutional Treaty, the more it all changed with Article 133 EC, the more it
continued to be the same thing. Changes have been made but one wonders whether these
suffice in qualitative and quantitative terms. On the other hand, stagnation continues to be
present: there is somehow a revival of the ERTA principle and France does not want to give
exclusive competence to the EC in cultural services, just to mention a few examples. Even
with Article I-13 (1)(e) of the Constitutional Treaty, by which the common commercial
policy will become exclusive Union competence, experience tells us that France, among
some countries, will reject it on grounds of audiovisual services, health and the so-called
specificite culturelle.
Much of the confusion in the common commercial policy has to do with the fact that
there is no clear policy framework in the EC Treaty itself. If the EC puts its acts together
externally, it might help it toward joining internally. If the EU wishes to achieve a main role
in global governance, changes need to be made. Following Lamy’s ideas,

for monitoring the subsidiarity principle referred to in Article I-11(3), the European Commission shall draw
national Parliaments' attention to proposals based on this Article.3. Measures based on this Article shall not
entail harmonisation of Member States' laws or regulations in cases where the Constitution excludes such
harmonisation.
394
Flexibility clause (Article I-18 of the Constitutional Treaty) is the procedure which gives the Union new
competences in areas unspecified by the Constitutional Treaty. If the Commission deems it necessary to conduct
a new action in order to reach the Union’s objectives, it makes a proposal to that effect to the EU Council,
which acts unanimously after obtaining the approval of the Parliament. With respect to the control procedure of
the subsidiarity principle, the EU Council may assign the necessary competences to the Union. The new
competences cannot, however, entail harmonization of Member States’ laws or regulations in cases where the
EU Constitutional Treaty excludes such harmonization.
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“the EU needs to speak at global level not just with a single voice, but
through a single mouth: the Commission should have competence, as in
trade, to negotiate on all matters pertaining to the management of
globalization (e.g., environment, transport, energy negotiations,
commodity organizations, OECD, FATF, WHO, FAO, etc.), and this
under the full control as well as scrutiny of both the European Parliament
and Member States.
[...] Qualified majority voting in the Council should apply to questions of
global economic governance.
[...] We need to enshrine, in the Treaties, a method for a gradual
integration of the three pillars of the EU and a gradual transfer of
intergovernmentally managed subject matters to the Community
method.”395

Full Community competence in almost all trade matters has enabled the EC to
develop a higher profile in international trade questions. Perhaps this can be a lesson to take
into account for the remaining trade matters under non-exclusive Community competence.
The role of the Member States’ national Parliaments and the European Parliament has to
grow: they need to be consulted, given that there continues to be a democratic deficit in the
negotiation and conclusion of EC international trade agreements.
Going from unanimity to qualified-majority voting for the negotiation and conclusion
of international agreements on services and commercial aspects of intellectual property (with
exceptions) has already been identified as a reduction of sovereignty. On the other hand, in
an enlarged EU of over 25 countries, any proposal requiring unanimity will be dead by
definition since it will be almost impossible to find consensus. Statistically, enlargement will
increase the risk of a Member State using its veto to prevent the Community from adopting a
common position. This collective weakness may work to the advantage of the Community's
trading partners.

395

Lamy, P. “Europe’s Role in Global Governance: The Way Ahead,” Speech given at Humboldt University,
Berlin, 6 May 2002, available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/index_en.htm (last visited May 24, 2003).
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There are today many situations in which national interests can be pursued only
through the EU level. The main exercise of the first fathers of Europe until Giscard and
Schmidt was to discern whether there is a national interest, no national solution and the only
solution that can reasonably satisfy the national interest is a common solution. As for the
future, I believe that there is no solid European architecture if the Commission is not at its
center. Perhaps one compromising alternative to the current situation might be to have
exclusive EC competence in trade matters, with clear exceptions of when and how these
should apply, given that the current status quo does not seem to be a good option.
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